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WHY WE NEED THE INDEPENDENT SECTOR: THE BEHAVIOR, 
LAW, AND ETHICS OF NOT-FOR-PROFIT HOSPITALS 
 
Jill R. Horwitz* 
Among the major forms of corporate ownership, the not-for-profit ownership 
form is distinct in its behavior, legal constraints, and moral obligations.  A new 
empirical analysis of the American hospital industry, using eleven years of data for 
all urban general hospitals in the country, shows that corporate form accounts for 
large differences in the provision of specific medical services.  Not-for-profit hospitals 
systematically provide both private and public goods that are in the public interest, and 
that other forms fail to provide.      
 Two hypotheses are proposed to account for the findings, one legal and one 
moral.  While no causal claims are made, not-for-profit hospital behavior is consistent 
with the behavior required by law and morality.  The moral argument, developed as a 
preliminary theory of not-for-profit ethics, also provides a potential reason to prefer not-
for-profit hospitals.  The findings provide a new justification for the not-for-profit tax 
exemption for hospitals, and also suggest new uses for ownership categories as 
regulatory tools 
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INTRODUCTION 
Diversity and pluralism.  In recent political and academic discourse, these 
words are served up as self-explanatory justifications for a host of claims and 
policies in fields ranging from biology to philosophy.  In the realms of ideas, 
emotions, species, races, or climates, difference is valued and celebrated 
intrinsically. 
Not so with variation in corporate form.  That for-profit, not-for-profit, 
and government-controlled organizations live alongside each other in industries 
such as health and art has long puzzled scholars, and the tax exemption for not-
for-profits has long troubled some.  Scholars are right to be skeptical that 
diversity in corporate form is of intrinsic value.  After all, we do not need the 
kind of diversity in which one type of hospital kills people and another type 
saves them.  Whether diversity should be applauded depends on the type of 
diversity and its context. 
Many scholars claim, however, that diversity of corporate form is essen-
tially a fiction.  Those who reject the not-for-profit form and, more commonly, 
the associated tax subsidies, reject the notion that not-for-profit status makes 
those organizations unique.  While the particular arguments vary, the message 
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is simple.  The not-for-profit form does not matter for the public good or, in 
many cases, matter at all.  Further, the inexplicable favors from the state in the 
form of tax subsidies should either be stopped,1 or provided only in exchange for 
narrowly defined social benefits such as free healthcare for the poor.  I argue 
that these views are mistaken. 
The legal categories of corporate form matter a great deal.  I present new 
empirical work showing that corporate form explains important differences in 
hospital behavior.  I argue that not-for-profit firms very likely provide public 
and private goods that are both in the public interest, which for-profit firms fail 
to provide.  By looking at only traditional measures of charitable behavior such 
as subsidized care for the poor, legal scholars have overlooked distinctions 
among ownership types.2  Instead, by examining the central function of 
hospitals—providing medical care—I find large differences among corporate 
forms, and argue that these imply large differences in hospital goals.  Relying 
on this empirical work, I recommend that at least some hospitals in a market 
should be not-for-profit.  We do not know enough to conclude which type of 
hospital or mix of types in a market is best.  For the time being, we should 
assume that markets consisting of either entirely for-profit or government 
hospitals would not serve the public interest. 
Whether the tax exemption causes the differences described below remains 
an open question, although one of secondary importance.  Why the legal lit-
erature has focused on the hospital tax exemption is puzzling.  It accounts for 
a small percentage of tax spending on hospital care.  If the authors are con-
cerned with efficiency in public spending or with the distortional effects of 
taxation, then the hospital tax exemption seems an uninspired first choice for 
policy change given its relative size.  More importantly, if the exemption is 
causing desirable not-for-profit behavior, then the costs of eliminating it may 
be high. 
In this work, I show large and significant correlations between corporate 
form and behavior.  I have not, however, identified the mechanisms that 
cause them.  In that sense, I treat corporate form as a black box.  Whatever 
                                                                                                                            
 1. See, e.g., M. Gregg Bloche, Health Policy Below the Waterline: Medical Care and the Charitable 
Exemption, 80 MINN. L. REV. 299, 404 (1995); Robert Charles Clark, Does the Nonprofit Form Fit the 
Hospital Industry?, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1416, 1473–77 (1980); John D. Colombo, John Colombo Says Tax 
the Hospitals, 9 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 1294, 1294–95 (1994); Henry Hansmann, The Two Nonprofit 
Sectors: Fee for Services Versus Donative Organizations, in THE FUTURE OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 91, 
94–97 (Virginia A. Hodgkinson & Richard W. Lyman eds., 1989) (arguing, for example, that not-for-
profit hospitals are anachronistic because the large public payer insurance programs of the 1960s 
removed the need for subsidized care and for-profit hospitals provide all remaining care as well or better 
than not-for-profits). 
 2. Colombo, supra note 1, at 1294 (identifying serving the poor as one of the conventional 
justifications for tax exemption). 
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the mechanisms are, they are likely complex.  Organizational, individual, and 
social processes interact with corporate ownership.  Healthcare financing sys-
tems, political activities, and cultural rituals as well as the law, could all generate 
behavioral differences.3  With some caution, therefore, I offer two hypotheses 
to stimulate discussion: one legal, one moral. 
First, the laws that govern not-for-profits may be at work.  The not-for-
profit legal regime requires charitable organizations to adopt and pursue public 
missions rather than profit maximization.  The differences that I find are con-
sistent with these legal requirements.  While the relationship between corpo-
rate behavior and the law could be causal, I do not make such a strong claim 
here.  However, if it is true that the law itself is causing behavior, the finding 
would be striking because not-for-profit law is primarily enabling law and, oth-
erwise, poorly enforced.  It would also raise further questions, such as whether 
not-for-profit orientation comes from socialization by the firm or employee 
self-selection.  Do particular kinds of people find their way to these institu-
tions?  Or, do the institutions train whomever happens to work there?  Likely 
both to some degree, but the balance of the two processes would recommend 
different regulatory policies. 
Second, I sketch a moral argument about not-for-profit organizations, 
particularly those that supply fundamental goods like healthcare.  I contend 
that all hospitals hold a duty of integrity, defined as the organization’s duty to 
follow its constitutive principles.  This duty generates obligations regarding 
whether and to what extent hospitals of different types are ethically permitted 
to respond to financial incentives.  The organizational ethics described here, 
like the legal regime, provide a plausible causal story because the observed 
behavioral differences are consistent with morally permissible objectives. 
For the purposes of this Article, the moral argument does instrumental 
work.  It may explain why not-for-profit hospitals act as they do.  With further 
development, the argument could serve as an independent basis for preferring 
that at least some hospitals maintain the not-for-profit form.  While incorpo-
ration as a not-for-profit itself may not cause differences in behavior, it ought 
to because these moral requirements arise from the corporate form. 
The preliminary moral argument outlined below serves three functions.  
First, it supports the view that the not-for-profit sector is a unique legal 
                                                                                                                            
 3. See Evelyn Brody, Institutional Dissonance in the Nonprofit Sector, 41 VILL. L. REV. 433, 
461–70 (1996) (discussing the social institutions that regulate not-for-profit organizations); Susan 
Rose-Ackerman, Altruism, Nonprofits, and Economic Theory, 34 J. ECON. LITERATURE 701, 719–21 
(1996) (arguing that managers with altruistic motivations are differentially attracted to not-for-profit 
institutions). 
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category, one significant for moral and behavioral reasons.4  Second, it offers a 
potential justification for the not-for-profit form, at least for those institutions 
within the sector that provide fundamental goods.  Third, it suggests the con-
duct we can reasonably expect from not-for-profit institutions.  The third 
function is particularly important given the vast literature, legal and otherwise, 
that identifies similarities among corporate types.  Because the law not only 
motivates institutional action but also reflects our aspirations for institutions, it 
must provide voluntary organizations with both clear expectations and assis-
tance in meeting them.5 
Regardless of their causes, the patterns identified in this Article have 
implications for healthcare and tax policy.  The findings imply that since the 
mix of services differs by form, the quality of healthcare is also likely to differ by 
form.  Therefore, all patients, not only poor patients, have reason to care about 
the ownership of the hospitals they visit.  Equity implications arise from the 
work as well.  Because the poor and uninsured disproportionately use govern-
ment hospitals, they have access to a restricted set of services.  For health policy 
reasons, therefore, we may wish to favor one form or establish different regula-
tory frameworks for different types of organizations. 
The results also inform the tax debate.  The near exclusive focus on charity 
care as an acceptable justification for tax exemption is too narrow.  Tax policy 
should reflect the other important public benefits disproportionately provided 
by not-for-profit hospitals. 
More generally, this work helps us see how we can use corporate form 
itself as a policy tool.  Regardless of the specific causes of behavioral differences, 
legal or moral, the hospital industry provides a good case for regulating institu-
tions based on ownership per se.  Policymakers, recognizing that different types 
of firms respond differently to the same regulation or incentive, could use that 
information to customize contracts according to corporate form.  They could 
impose different substantive regulations, allow only one type of form, or regu-
late the mix in a market. 
Treating corporate form as an explanatory category can be a useful 
approach for regulating corporations when certain conditions are met—when 
behavioral patterns can be identified; when they involve goods that are difficult 
                                                                                                                            
 4. See Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principals: The Economic Convergence of the Nonprofit and 
For-Profit Organizational Forms, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 457, 535 (1996) (noting that economic 
relationships are not the only influences on not-for-profit organizations); Barbara K. Bucholtz, Reflections 
on the Role of Nonprofit Associations in a Representative Democracy, 7 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 555, 
576 (1998) (offering an alternative account of not-for-profit organizations based on their role as citizen-
ship trainers). 
 5. See J. David Seay & Bruce C. Vladeck, Mission Matters, in IN SICKNESS AND IN HEALTH: THE 
MISSION OF VOLUNTARY HEALTH CARE INSTITUTIONS 1, 30 (J. David Seay & Bruce C. Vladeck eds., 
1988). 
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to observe directly, such as the availability and quality of medical services; and 
when more targeted contracting is difficult or costly.  Under these conditions, 
regulating institutions based on the lines that separate corporate types, no 
matter how blurred those lines may be, can enhance public welfare. 
The set up of the Article is as follows.  Part I explains why we should 
care about not-for-profits, particularly in the hospital industry.  Part II outlines 
the legal scholarship and the evidence upon which it relies.  Part III summarizes 
the empirical work.  Part IV outlines not-for-profit law, offering it as a plausible 
causal mechanism for the empirical findings.  Part V offers a moral explanation 
for not-for-profit behavior and sketches a duty of integrity that adheres to the 
corporate form.  I conclude that at least some hospitals in every market should 
adopt the not-for-profit form. 
I.   NOT-FOR-PROFITS AND HOSPITALS: BACKGROUND 
AND SIGNIFICANCE 
Not-for-profit organizations play multiple roles in society.  They deliver 
important social services and function as safety nets where government fails.  
They also provide avenues of civic participation that generate social capital,6 and 
allow for the expression and promotion of diverse values or world views7 that 
sustain democracy. 
Hospitals play a central role in the domestic not-for-profit sector.8  They 
account for over 46 percent of not-for-profit expenses9 and 30 percent of the 
                                                                                                                            
 6. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC TRADITIONS IN MODERN 
ITALY (1993); Bucholtz, supra note 4, at 571–76; Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: America’s Declining 
Social Capital, 6 J. DEMOCRACY 65, 67–70 (1995). 
 7. David Horton Smith, The Impact of the Volunteer Sector on Society, in THE NONPROFIT 
ORGANIZATION: ESSENTIAL READINGS 347, 347–55 (David L. Gies et al. eds., 1990); Martha Minow, 
Partners, Not Rivals?: Redrawing the Lines Between Public and Private, Non-Profit and Profit, and Secular 
and Religious, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1061, 1084–85 (2000). 
 8. The term “not-for-profit sector” describes a large number of organizations, many of which 
have little in common.  This Article is concerned with the type of corporations that could meet the 
requirements of Internal Revenue Code section 501(c)(3) and tests of permissible purposes in state 
statutes.  See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 180, § 4 (West 2003).  Burton A. Weisbrod has defined not-
for-profits by identifying the constraints under which they operate and benefits they receive 
(nondistribution constraint, regulatory entry constraints, tax exemptions, postal subsidies, tax deductibility 
of donations, factor supply markets that include volunteer labor, and demand differences) and the 
objectives which they pursue, which he terms bonoficing (seeking to generate less than maximum 
profitmaking while producing socially desirable output).  Burton A. Weisbrod, Institutional Form and 
Organizational Behavior, in PRIVATE ACTION AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 69, 71–72 (Walter W. Powell & 
Elisabeth S. Clemens eds., 1998). 
 9. Elizabeth T. Boris, Introduction to NONPROFIT AND GOVERNMENT: COLLABORATION AND 
CONFLICT 12 (Elizabeth T. Boris & Eugene Steurle eds., 1999).  In 1996, the not-for-profit hospitals 
that responded to the American Hospital Association’s Annual Survey reported $260.6 billion in expen-
ditures.  LESTER M. SALAMON, AMERICA’S NONPROFIT SECTOR: A PRIMER 81 fig.6.5 (2d ed. 1999). 
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not-for-profit labor force.10  A lot of money is at stake.  With annual revenues 
that account for $412 billion or 4 percent of Gross Domestic Product, hospitals 
represent approximately one-third of all health spending.11 
Despite their prominence and importance, hospitals have been a hard case 
for legal scholars trying to explain the not-for-profit sector and its benefits.  What 
makes hospitals such a tough case?  One problem is that contemporary hospitals 
of all corporate forms—not-for-profit, for-profit, and government—are at once 
agents of healing and agents of business.  This was not always true.  In the early 
twentieth century, not-for-profit hospitals were essentially almshouses.  They 
were small, charitable institutions that provided free care to poor people deemed 
worthy by hospital boards.12  The more fortunate received care from their fami-
lies at home. 
Contemporary hospitals bear little resemblance to almshouses.13  Techno-
logical advances have made medical care effective at curing illness, treating 
chronic conditions, and prolonging life to an unprecedented degree.14  Conse-
quently, hospitals are now the sites of life transitions for rich and poor patients 
alike; we are born, give birth, suffer illness, and die in hospitals.  All patients 
must rely on them. 
Moreover, contemporary hospitals are big business.  Charitable donations 
account for very little of the $412 billion in hospital revenue.15  Large private 
and public insurance payments are needed for equipping and staffing modern 
hospitals.16  In addition to Medicare, Medicaid, and other programs, the gov-
ernment supports not-for-profit hospitals through tax advantages such as 
                                                                                                                            
 10. MURRAY S. WEITZMAN ET AL., THE NEW NONPROFIT ALMANAC AND DESK 
REFERENCE: THE ESSENTIAL FACTS AND FIGURES FOR MANAGERS, RESEARCHERS, AND 
VOLUNTEERS 40–41 tbl.2.6 (2002) (using 1998 percentages). 
 11. Katharine Levit et al., Inflation Spurs Health Spending in 2000, 21 HEALTH AFF., 172, 173, 
180 (2002). 
 12. CHARLES E. ROSENBERG, THE CARE OF STRANGERS: THE RISE OF AMERICA’S HOSPITAL 
SYSTEM 237–61 (1987). 
 13. DAVID ROSNER, A ONCE CHARITABLE ENTERPRISE: HOSPITALS AND HEALTH CARE IN 
BROOKLYN AND NEW YORK, 1885–1915 (1982); ROSENBERG, supra note 12, at 237–61 (1987). 
 14. DAVID M. CUTLER, YOUR MONEY OR YOUR LIFE: STRONG MEDICINE FOR AMERICA’S 
HEALTH CARE SYSTEM (2003). 
 15. See Richard G. Frank & David S. Salkever, Market Forces, Diversification of Activity, and the 
Mission of Not-for-Profit Hospitals, in THE CHANGING HOSPITAL INDUSTRY: COMPARING NOT-FOR-
PROFIT AND FOR-PROFIT INSTITUTIONS 195, 199 (David M. Cutler ed., 2000) (discussing trends in 
hospital financing; detailing amount and percentage of hospital donations in Table 6.3).  Private 
donations accounted for 3.6 percent of not-for-profit hospital revenue in 1992. 
 16. See Frank A. Sloan et al., The Demise of Hospital Philanthropy, 28 ECON. INQUIRY 725, 725 
(1990).  According to the authors’ calculations, “[r]eal donations for medical facility construction rose from 
$76 million in 1935 to a peak of $2.1 billion in 1965 and fell to $603 million by 1981 (1984 dollars).”  
Id.  “In 1984, only 5 percent of the total spent on such construction was funded by philanthropy.”  Id. 
(citing K.R. Levit et al., National Health Expenditures, 1984, 7 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 1 (1985)). 
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federal and state income tax exemption, property tax exemption, tax-exempt 
debt financing, and other legal advantages.17 
Of the nearly 2800 urban acute care hospitals, slightly fewer than 20 per-
cent are government hospitals run by state, local, and federal governments, 
slightly fewer than 20 percent are for-profit hospitals, and the remainder are 
not-for-profit corporations.18  Yet, general hospitals of all corporate forms are very 
much alike.  They operate under the same healthcare regulations, provide inpa-
tient medical care, compete against each other for patients and doctors, derive 
funding from many of the same sources,19 and serve seemingly comparable social 
functions.  These striking similarities raise the question of whether the not-for-
profit legal category is a coherent and stable concept of explanatory or descrip-
tive significance in the hospital industry or elsewhere.  In other words, do the 
legal categories matter? 
II.   LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP: BEHAVIORAL EVIDENCE 
AND ITS LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE 
A. The Legal Literature 
The legal literature on corporate form adopts a tone of tough realism.  In 
discussing the appropriateness of not-for-profit ownership, hospital conversions,20 
and not-for-profit tax exemptions, authors characterize the widespread preference 
for the not-for-profit form as one of “enthusiasts”21 who rely on intuition rather 
than on hard data.22  Analytical thinkers, these scholars tell us, should not be 
fooled “by the outdated but still-cherished national myth of community-based 
nonprofit hospitals and the Norman Rockwell image of a family doctor driving 
his team of horses through a snowstorm to treat a sick child.”23  Regardless of 
                                                                                                                            
 17. Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 836–37 (1980). 
 18. Data compiled by author from the American Hospital Associations, Annual Survey of 
Hospitals (1988–1998).  These percentages have remained remarkably constant over the past fifty years. 
 19. Jill R. Horwitz, Corporate Form of Hospitals: Behavior and Obligations (2002) (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with author); Frank & Salkever, supra note 15, at 195–215. 
 20. For the purposes of this Article, the term “conversion” is defined as any mechanism by 
which a hospital changes its ownership from not-for-profit to for-profit or vice versa.  Hospitals convert 
using many mechanisms from simple asset sales to complex joint ventures.  In some states, a not-for-
profit hospital may amend its articles of incorporation to switch forms.   Other methods of converting 
include: acquisitions, mergers, corporate restructurings, consolidation, joint ventures with for-profit 
corporations, and lease agreements. 
 21. David A. Hyman, Hospital Conversions: Fact, Fantasy, and Regulatory Follies, 23 J. CORP. L. 
741, 756 (1998). 
 22. See Clark, supra note 1, at 1417–19 (discussing the related issue of whether the preference 
for the not-for-profit corporate form is based on evidence that not-for-profit hospitals are able to solve 
information and other market failures). 
 23. Hyman, supra note 21, at 741. 
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historical differences, we are told that the two types of hospitals “are barely dis-
tinguishable” today.24 
Much of this vast literature examines the not-for-profit tax exemption for 
hospitals.  Few articles consider the role of the not-for-profit form itself.  Mark 
A. Hall and John D. Colombo provide a useful taxonomy of theories offered to 
justify the tax exemption.  These theories are: (1) per se (a historical explana-
tion based on the common law of charitable trusts); (2) quid pro quo 
(exemption in exchange for serving the poor, an activity that relieves public 
burden); (3) community benefit (similar to altruism theories in which not-
for-profits offer services of particular benefit such as quality or caring); (4) 
academic (a catch-all category that includes theories based on the practical 
difficulty of using conventional tax accounting methods for not-for-profit 
financing and capital subsidy theories); and, (5) donative (the authors’ theory 
that institutions that receive a high percentage of public donations should 
receive tax exemptions because the donations signal public need).25  More 
simply, Andras Kosaras has reviewed the theories applying a commonly used 
two-category taxonomy: tax base theories (based on the difficulty of measuring 
tax incidence) versus subsidy theories (based on the reward of beneficial 
activities).26 
Many who assess these theories find not-for-profits insufficiently valuable 
or unique to justify the form or its preferential tax treatment.27  I think that 
these assessments are too negative for two reasons.  First, they are based on 
empirical literature that mainly explores hospital finances, rather than more 
central hospital activities such as providing quality medical care.28  Second, 
the authors highlight one strand of the empirical literature—spending on 
                                                                                                                            
 24. Kevin M. Wood, Legislatively-Mandated Charity Care for Nonprofit Hospitals: Does Govern-
ment Intervention Make Any Difference?, 20 REV. LITIG. 709, 718 (2001). 
 25. Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Charitable Status of Nonprofit Hospitals: Toward a 
Donative Theory of Tax Exemption, 66 WASH. L. REV. 307 (1991). 
 26. Andras Kosaras, Note, Federal Income and State Property Tax Exemption of Commercialized 
Nonprofits: Should Profit-Seeking Art Museums Be Tax Exempt?, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 115, 165 (2000). 
 27. See, e.g., Bloche, supra note 1, at 299 (reviewing and discussing several possible justifica-
tions for tax exemption, finding them insufficient, and arguing that removal of the exemption should be 
a long term tax and health policy aim); Clark, supra note 1, at 1418 (making a theoretical argument 
regarding predicted hospital behavior, but arguing that any theory must be grounded in empirical proof); 
Colombo, supra note 1, at 1294–95 (arguing that not-for-profit hospital behavior does not meet the tests 
for exemption under several theories); Hansmann, supra note 17, at 866–68 (arguing that the contract 
failures solved by not-for-profit firms are not present in the case of hospitals and, therefore, not-for-profit 
hospitals are not needed because for-profit hospitals can supply all needed hospital goods). 
 28. See Weisbrod, supra note 8, at 74 (discussing the relative ease of inputs such as production 
costs rather than outputs such as quality, external effects, and distribution to others than those with the 
greatest willingness to pay); Gabriel Picone et al., Are For-Profit Conversions Harmful to Patients and to 
Medicare? 33 RAND J. ECON. 507, 508 (2002) (noting that studies on corporate ownership have not 
tested whether conversions affect quality of care). 
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uncompensated care—as a measure of community benefit.29  Unfortunately, it 
is a miserable measure of community benefit.  Because uncompensated care 
generally includes all bad debt, only some of the spending known as “charity 
care” goes to poor and uninsured patients.30 
Regardless of its merits as a measure of charity, research on the gap 
between for-profit and not-for-profit provision of uncompensated care cannot 
support arguments in favor of the not-for-profit sector.31  While estimates vary,32 
the gap is likely small.  One study using 1994 data shows that uncompensated 
care amounts to 4.5 percent of revenue for not-for-profit, and 4.0 percent of 
revenue for for-profit hospitals.33  Another study, using 1981 data, finds similar 
levels of charity care provision in similar markets, but also finds that suburban 
for-profits locate near better-insured people and, therefore, face lower demand 
for charity services.34  Some discover no evidence of decline in uncompensated 
care after conversions from not-for-profit to for-profit form.35  Others find some.36  
                                                                                                                            
 29. Several authors have noted this focus in the legal literature.  See, e.g., David A. Hyman, 
supra note 21, at 756–57 (identifying the focus on charity care spending and explaining it as a result of the 
difficulty of measuring more amorphous activities such as virtue); Jack Needleman, The Role of 
Nonprofits in Healthcare, 26 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y, & L. 1113, 1122 (2001) (identifying uncom-
pensated care as the most common measure of community benefit); J. David Seay, Tax-Exemption for 
Hospitals: Towards an Understanding of Community Benefit, 2 HEALTH MATRIX 35 (1992) (identifying and 
criticizing this focus); Helena G. Rubinstein, Note, Nonprofit Hospitals and the Federal Tax Exemption: A 
Fresh Prescription, 7 HEALTH MATRIX 381 (1997) (arguing that tax exemption should be granted to hospi-
tals that provide benefits such as knowledge to people nationwide rather than charity care defined locally). 
 30. See Bradford H. Gray, Conversion of HMOs and Hospitals: What’s at Stake?, HEALTH AFF., 
Mar.–Apr. 1997, at 29, 39; see also Frank Sloan, Not-for-Profit Ownership and Hospital Behavior, in 1B 
HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECON. 1141, 1160–61 (Anthony J. Culyer & Joseph P. Newhouse eds., 2000). 
 31. In addition to comparing not-for-profits and for-profits, some scholars have compared the 
value of charity care provided by not-for-profit hospitals with the value of the tax exemptions they 
receive, and concluded that not-for-profits do not earn their keep.  See Jan P. Clement et al., What Do 
We Want and What Do We Get from Not-for-Profit Hospitals?, 39 HOSP. & HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN. 159 
(1994) (finding that between 20 and 80 percent of California hospitals provided community benefits 
that met recommended community benefit standards); Michael A. Morrisey et al., Do Nonprofit 
Hospitals Pay Their Way?, HEALTH AFF., Winter 1996, at 132, 137 (reporting that only 20 percent of 
California hospitals provide a level of uncompensated care greater than the value of the tax subsidies 
they receive). 
 32. Gray, supra note 30, at 38–41. 
 33. Sloan, supra note 30, at 1160 (citing U.S PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT 
COMMISSION, MEDICARE AND THE AMERICAN HEALTHCARE SYSTEM 84 (1996)). 
 34. Edward C. Norton & Douglas O. Staiger, How Hospital Ownership Affects Access to Care for 
the Uninsured, 25 RAND J. ECON. 171, 172 (1994). 
 35. See Gary J. Young et al., Does the Sale of Nonprofit Hospitals Threaten Health Care for the Poor?, 
HEALTH AFF., Jan.–Feb. 1997, at 137 (studying the provision of uncompensated care, including charity 
care and bad debt, in seventeen California hospitals that converted from not-for-profit to for-profit 
status). 
 36. See Kenneth E. Thorpe et al., Hospital Conversions, Margins, and the Provision of Uncompen-
sated Care, HEALTH AFF., Nov.–Dec. 2000, at 187 (finding that uncompensated care fell after conversion 
from not-for-profit to for-profit status from 5.3 to 4.7 percent of hospital revenues on average; and 
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Still others argue that, as part of a strategy to avoid low-paying patients, urban 
for-profit hospitals locate near hospitals that the poor are most likely to visit.37 
However, accountings of charity care are often misleading.  Any com-
parison among firms must consider hospital location and the mix of hospitals in 
the market because both affect the provision of subsidized care.  Even controlling 
for these factors, it is unclear how to interpret differences in the levels of charity 
care provision by ownership type.  For-profits may offer less subsidized care than 
not-for-profits because they face less demand, but they may choose to locate in 
places where they are unlikely to face demand.  Not-for-profits might avoid 
uninsured patients as a defensive strategy to survive for-profit competition.  In 
fact, there is evidence that not-for-profit hospitals are more profit seeking when 
faced with for-profit hospital competition.38 
Given this evidence, it is not surprising that so many scholars reject not-for-
profit theories based on claims that not-for-profits differentially provide public 
goods or relieve government burdens through their provision of charity care.39  
                                                                                                                            
uncompensated care fell after government to for-profit status from 5.2 to 2.7 percent of hospital 
revenues on average). 
 37. Jason R. Barro, Hospital Conversions to For-Profit Status: Causes and Consequences (1998) 
(unpublished manuscript on file with author). 
 38. Mark Duggan, Hospital Market Structure and the Behavior of Not-for-Profit Hospitals, 33 RAND 
J. ECON. 433–46 (2002). 
 39. Many scholars advance the insufficient provision of charity care as evidence for removing 
tax benefits or eliminating the not-for-profit status of hospitals.  See, e.g., Thomas R. Barker, 
Reexamining the 501(c)(3) Exemption of Hospitals as Charitable Organizations, 48 TAX NOTES 339, 350–51 
(1990) (recommending implementation of a charity care standard as the standard for hospital tax 
exemption qualification); Colombo, supra note 1, at 1294–95 (arguing for the revocation of hospital tax 
exemption because, although they may provide goods, the tax exemption is not related to the provision 
of those goods and there is no evidence that for-profits could not provide the same goods); John D. 
Colombo & Mark A. Hall, The Future of Tax-Exemption for Nonprofit Hospitals and Other Healthcare 
Providers, 2 HEALTH MATRIX 1, 30–34 (1992) [hereinafter Colombo & Hall, Tax-Exemption] 
(discussing and rejecting the quid pro quo theory of tax exemption because not-for-profit hospitals do 
not provide more subsidized care than for-profit hospitals); Charles B. Gilbert, Health-Care Reform and 
the Nonprofit Hospital: Is Tax-Exempt Status Still Warranted?, 26 URB. LAW. 143, 173–74 (1994) 
(advocating that only a few not-for-profit hospitals, those that provide charity care at a level to justify 
exemption, be permitted to keep their status); Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Corporation Law, 129 U. 
PA. L. REV. 497, 585 (1981) (explaining that hospitals can qualify for federal tax exemption even when 
they offer no subsidized care for the poor, implying that subsidized care for the poor is the only care that 
could constitute charitable care); Hall & Colombo, supra note 25, at 345–46 (dismissing the quid pro 
quo theory for tax exemption, in which they define charity care as the government burden to be 
relieved, because not-for-profits do not provide sufficient charity care); David A. Hyman, The 
Conundrum of Charitability: Reassessing Tax Exemption for Hospitals, 16 AM. J. L. & MED. 327, 375–76 
(1990) (questioning the appropriateness of the not-for-profit form for hospitals and, while noting that 
community benefit does not fully constitute charity care, basing his challenge to the argument that not-
for-profit hospitals exhibit special virtues on the relative provision of charity care); James B. Simpson & 
Sarah D. Strum, How Good a Samaritan? Federal Income Tax Exemption for Charitable Hospitals 
Reconsidered, 14 UNIV. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 633 (1991) (expressing dismay that only some not-for-
profits offer charity care and that the I.R.S. does not require its provision). 
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They observe that for-profit hospitals provide considerable amounts of charity 
care, some say more than not-for-profits,40 and not all not-for-profits do so.41  
They note that the bulk of all hospital care is provided by government hospitals 
and not-for-profit academic medical centers, implying that teaching status, not 
corporate form, is associated with altruism.42  They insinuate that the good 
things not-for-profits do for communities are not selfless acts but, instead, are 
loss-leaders that bring in profitable business.43 
One need not respond to the charity care evidence with a wholesale 
rejection of the not-for-profit form.  Instead, those who believe that “the provi-
sion of charity care . . . [is] the highest priority for discharging one’s charitable 
obligations,”44 can demand that not-for-profits provide more.  There are many 
methods for increasing not-for-profit accountability in this regard.45  Some 
endorse increasing the stringency of state laws that are already in place.  Texas 
law, for example, requires not-for-profit hospitals to provide charity care and 
monitors its provision.46  Some observers encourage local governments to bring 
ad valorem lawsuits against not-for-profit hospitals that do not provide 
                                                                                                                            
 40. Hall & Colombo, supra note 25, at 348 (maintaining that not-for-profits do not provide 
more charity care than do for-profits); Hyman, supra note 21, at 748 n.64 (arguing against concern that 
charity care will decline if not-for-profit hospitals convert to for-profit) (citing BRADFORD H. GRAY, 
THE PROFIT MOTIVE AND PATIENT CARE: THE CHANGING ACCOUNTABILITY OF DOCTORS AND 
HOSPITALS (1991)); Gilbert, supra note 39, at 171 (arguing that for-profits provide more charity care 
than do not-for-profits when measured correctly); A. Kay B. Roska, Comment, Nonprofit Hospitals: The 
Relationship Between Charitable Tax Exemptions and Medical Care for Indigents, 43 SW. L.J. 759, 772 
(1989) (citing Regina Herzlinger & William Krasker, Who Profits from Nonprofits?, 87 HARV. BUS. REV. 
93 (1987) (arguing that for-profits provide more charity care)). 
 41. Hyman, supra note 21, at 759 n.65 (citing Morrisey et al., supra note 31); Simpson & Strum, 
supra note 39, at 638 (noting that only some not-for-profits offer charity care). 
 42. Bloche, supra note 1, at 317 (arguing that uncompensated care is mostly provided by teaching 
hospitals not community hospitals); Hyman, supra note 21, at 759 n.66 (citing Joyce M. Mann et al., A 
Profile of Uncompensated Hospital Care, 1983–1995, HEALTH AFF., Mar.–Apr. 1997, at 223, 227)). 
 43. Colombo, supra note 1, at 1295. 
 44. Alice A. Noble et al., Charitable Hospital Accountability: A Review and Analysis of Legal and 
Policy Initiatives, 26 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 116, 132 (1998). 
 45. Many scholars advocate increasing the stringency of the tax exemption standards by basing 
it entirely or in large part on the provision of charity care.  See, e.g., id.; Gilbert, supra note 39, at 169–71 
(proposing that tax benefits be awarded to a small number of hospitals in exchange for considerable 
amounts of charity care); Hyman, supra note 39, at 376–79 (questioning the appropriateness of the tax 
exemption generally and advocating subsidies targeted to specific behavior, behavior included in what 
he terms the “conservative standard” which concentrates almost entirely on free care for the needy); Roska, 
supra note 40, at 781–83 (advocating requiring charity care as a prerequisite for tax exemption).  But see 
Kevin B. Fischer, Note, Tax Exemption and the Health Care Industry: Are the Challenges to Tax-Exempt 
Status Justified?, 49 VAND. L. REV. 161, 191–94 (1996) (arguing that tax exemption should, at least in 
part, be based on the provision of community benefits, but that community benefits should be broadly 
interpreted according to local needs). 
 46. Wood, supra note 24, at 716–17. 
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sufficient charity care to justify local property tax exemptions.47  Still others 
advocate conditioning federal tax exemption on community needs assessments 
and on demonstrations that not-for-profit hospitals have responded appropri-
ately to those needs.48  These suggestions follow legislative and judicial trends 
requiring charity care in exchange for hospital tax exemptions.49 
In addition to the tax exemption theories, my argument also bears on 
the more general theories of ownership because so many of them employ 
hospitals as a central example of the not-for-profit form.  Henry Hansmann 
maintains, for example, that the not-for-profit form eases the provision of 
goods for which contracting is inherently difficult.  According to Hans-
mann, the inability of not-for-profits to distribute gains, known as the non-
distribution constraint, limits managerial abuse.  The constraint provides 
quality assurance for goods produced by companies that are commercial 
(organizations in which revenues come from fees), entrepreneurial (organi-
zations that are controlled by directors rather than patrons), and offer 
complex goods (goods that are difficult for the consumer to evaluate).50  
Hansmann argues that although not-for-profit hospitals have these charac-
teristics, the complex goods explanation does not apply.  He believes that 
sophisticated doctors, rather than unsophisticated patients, make treatment 
decisions.  Informed specialists rather than uninformed consumers buy the 
complex good of hospital care.51  Hansmann’s assumption that the hospital-
patient relationship is one that is mediated by patient representatives necessar-
ily limits the range of goods that patients and society need and, therefore, limits 
the plausible justifications for not-for-profit hospitals and the not-for-profit form. 
As discussed below in more detail, this characterization accounts for 
neither the direct influence hospitals have over patients nor the indirect 
influence that hospitals exercise through doctors, such as the capital invest-
ment decisions that constrain doctors’ treatment options.  Hansmann claims that 
because “the function of providing subsidized care for the poor has largely been 
taken away from them, nonprofit hospitals may be considered anachronistic, 
                                                                                                                            
 47. Charles J. Milligan, Jr., Provisions of Uncompensated Care in American Hospitals: The 
Role of the Tax Code, the Federal Courts, Catholic Health Care Facilities, and Local Governments in 
Defining the Problem of Access for the Poor, 31 CATH. LAW. 7, 27 (1987). 
 48. Simpson & Strum, supra note 39, at 662–66. 
 49. See, e.g., Colombo & Hall, Tax-Exemption, supra note 39 (examining proposed federal 
legislation regarding hospital tax exemption); Gilbert, supra note 39, at 165–68 (examining pro-
posed federal legislation regarding hospital tax exemption); Noble et al., supra note 44, at 116 
(discussing state efforts to require community benefits, particularly in the form of charity care); 
G.J. Simon, Jr., Comment, Non-Profit Hospital Tax-Exemptions: Where Did They Come From and 
Where Are They Going?, 31 DUQ. L. REV. 343 (1993) (reviewing attempts to impose property tax 
on not-for-profit corporations). 
 50. Hansmann, supra note 17, at 844–45, 862–63. 
 51. Id. at 866. 
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providing no important services that are not provided as well or better by for-
profit hospitals.”52  This claim ignores medical goods provided by hospital 
institutions.  Eliminating the assumption that the hospital-patient relation-
ship is entirely mediated by autonomous doctors, one can readily observe that 
not-for-profits provide critical public and private goods that conventional 
markets fail to provide. 
Examining other public benefits besides charity care would not undermine 
Hansmann’s theoretical argument that not-for-profits are useful for solving 
market failures.  It does, however, extend the argument to a larger class of insti-
tutions.53  Similarly, Hall and Colombo may have given short shrift to the quid 
pro quo theory of tax exemption because, relying on the literature advancing 
the theory, they equate government burden with treating the uninsured.54 
Not-for-profit hospitals—like all hospitals that take their missions seri-
ously—should treat or arrange care for poor patients.  However, whether the 
treating hospital itself finances that care should not be the sole, or even the 
primary, measure of benefit provided by not-for-profit hospitals.  Providing 
healthcare for the uninsured, a population now numbering forty-one million 
people,55 serves a critical public function.  But, the most effective way to pro-
vide that care, is a controversial matter.56  There is no evidence that relying on 
hospitals to open their doors to indigent patients who come to their emergency 
rooms is the best method, or even a good method, of making and keeping 
people healthy.57  That free care at hospitals currently serves as the safety net 
for many poor and uninsured people is a regrettable necessity.  But, it should not 
be the primary focus of not-for-profit law as applied to hospitals.  There are many 
hospital activities that affect all patients who seek care in these institutions, the 
                                                                                                                            
 52. Hansmann, supra note 1, at 92. 
 53. Hansmann concedes that if it could be shown that not-for-profit hospitals differentially 
supplied public goods, they would be better characterized as donative rather than commercial organi-
zations.  Hansmann, supra note 17, at 867 n.93 (discussing A. James Lee & Burton A. Weisbrod, 
Collective Goods and the Voluntary Sector: The Case of the Hospital Industry, in THE VOLUNTARY 
NONPROFIT SECTOR (Burton A. Weisbrod ed., 1977)).  If not-for-profit hospitals differentially provide 
patients the appropriate mix of medical services, a mix that would not be chosen by firms seeking to 
maximize profits, then not-for-profits provide a social good.  This argument is made in detail below. 
 54. Hall & Colombo, supra note 25, at 345–46 (dismissing the quid pro quo theory for tax 
exemption, in which they define charity care as the government burden to be relieved, because not-for-
profits do not provide sufficient charity care). 
 55. KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY 
FOUNDATION: THE UNINSURED AND THEIR ACCESS TO HEALTHCARE (2003), available at 
http://www.kff.org/content/2003/142004/142004.pdf. 
 56. See, e.g., HEALTH AFF., Jan.–Feb. 2001, at 8–48 (a journal issue comprised of articles discussing 
the best methods for expanding health insurance coverage as a method of improving access to care). 
 57. KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, supra note 55 (“Charitable 
physicians and the safety net of community clinics and public hospitals do not substitute for health 
insurance.”). 
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rich and the poor alike.  These activities differ according to corporate form, and 
should be considered in evaluating whether not-for-profits differentially con-
tribute to public welfare. 
The few legal scholars examining the corporate form of hospitals per se, 
rather than tax exemption in particular, have studied the broader social science 
literature58 and concluded that not-for-profits and for-profits behave similarly.  
They have primarily examined differences in hospital financial behavior, such 
as the exercise of market power.59  Some legal scholars have discussed the differ-
ential production of positive externalities such as medical research and educa-
tion.60  But, in general, they have grounded their arguments on a narrow range 
of hospital activities. 
The hospital ownership literature is both more extensive and incomplete 
than many authors note.  Indeed, there are rich empirical and theoretical lit-
eratures about the corporate form of hospitals, though their results are incon-
clusive and often contradictory.61  Importantly, that literature has focused 
primarily on financial measures such as differences in costs, profits, billing, the 
economic value of uncompensated care, and responsiveness to financial pres-
sure.62  Behavioral measures of social welfare such as quality of care63 and 
associated decisionmaking procedures (for example, the ability of medical 
practitioners to make patient-specific decisions, how hospitals choose to 
offer and market services, and how care is rationed at the hospital level) are 
equally, if not more, important for an adequate evaluation of hospital behavior. 
                                                                                                                            
 58. See, e.g., Mark Krause, Comment, “First, Do No Harm”: An Analysis of the Nonprofit Hos-
pital Sale Acts, 45 UCLA L. REV. 503, 515 (1997) (citing a wide range of empirical evidence regarding 
hospital behavior).  Krause concludes that “both proponents and opponents of hospital conversions can 
find support for their positions.  Neither organizational form appears definitively superior.”  Id. 
 59. For example, not-for-profit and public hospitals behave like for-profits in market behavior such 
as raising prices when they have market power.  Wood, supra note 24, at 719 (citing Glenn Melnick et 
al., Market Power and Hospital Pricing: Are Nonprofits Different?, HEALTH AFF., May–June 1999, at 167). 
 60. See, e.g., Bloche, supra note 1, at 311–19 (examining differences in positive externalities 
such as education and rejecting these externalities as a justification for tax exemption). 
 61. Though the measures they use are not the same, some of the literature on hospital costs finds 
no difference in total costs per comparable chain hospitals of different types.  Timothy S. Snail & James 
C. Robinson, Organizational Diversification in the American Hospital, 19 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 417, 
436–37 (1998).  Some find differences in medical payments among types.  E.g., Frank Sloan et al., 
Hospital Ownership & Cost and Quality of Care: Is There a Dime’s Worth of Difference?, 20 J. HEALTH 
ECON. 1–21 (2001).  Others find large differences in administrative costs and in total costs.  See, e.g., 
Steffie Woolhandler & David H. Himmelstein, Costs of Care and Administration at For-Profit and Other 
Hospitals in the United States, 336 NEW ENG. J. MED. 769–74 (1997) [hereinafter Woolhandler & 
Himmelstein, Costs of Care]; Steffie Woolhandler & David H. Himmelstein, When Money Is the 
Mission—the High Costs of Investor-Owned Care, 341 NEW ENG. J. MED. 444–46 (1999). 
 62. See Sloan, supra note 30, for a review of the economic literature on behavioral differences.  
See also Picone et al., supra note 28. 
 63. But see Hall & Colombo, supra note 25, at 375 (citing J. ROGERS HOLLINGSWORTH & 
ELLEN JANE HOLLINGSWORTH, CONTROVERSY ABOUT AMERICAN HOSPITALS: FUNDING, OWNERSHIP 
AND PERFORMANCE (1987)) (referencing older work on cost and quality, but not discussing it in detail). 
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B. The Social Science Literature 
Previous empirical studies of hospital behavior do not support the wide-
spread assertion that not-for-profit and for-profit hospitals are alike in all 
important respects.  In making such claims, legal scholars have overlooked 
work that demonstrates differences between the types.  These studies, coupled 
with new evidence presented below, provide a reasonable basis for not-for-
profit legal preferences. 
The studies regarding financial behavior of hospitals have identified simi-
larities and differences among corporate types.  For example, there is little 
difference between for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals regarding costs64 or 
sources of capital.65  And not-for-profits, like for-profits, will exercise market 
power if they can66 and compensate their managers based on financial perform-
ance.67  However, other studies show differences in financial behavior.  Medicare 
payments for patients treated at for-profit hospitals are higher than those for 
patients treated at not-for-profits.68  For-profit hospitals also appear to be rela-
tively responsive to financial incentives, both by closing or restructuring in the 
face of financial pressure,69 or by investing in profitable, post-acute services.70  For-
profit hospital margins were larger than public and not-for-profit hospital margins 
during the 1990s.71  And, some of the behavior correlated with the for-profit 
form is relatively costly for the government.  For-profits are more likely than 
not-for-profits to engage in a practice known as upcoding, which involves shift-
ing the patient diagnosis to increase reimbursement.  For example, a for-profit 
hospital might describe a patient for billing purposes as having complicated 
rather than simple pneumonia simply to increase revenue.72 
                                                                                                                            
 64. Snail & Robinson, supra note 61, at 436–37; Woolhandler & Himmelstein, Costs of Care, 
supra note 61; cf. Weisbrod, supra note 8, at 77. 
 65. Mary A. Laschober & James C. Vertrees, Hospital Financing in the United States, in  HOSPITAL 
FINANCING IN SEVEN COUNTRIES at 135, 146–47 (Mary A. Laschober et. al. eds., 1995). 
 66. Martin Gaynor & Deborah Haas-Wilson, Change, Consolidation, and Competition in Health 
Care Markets, 13 J. ECON. PERSP. 141, 152–53 (1999). 
 67. James A. Brickley & R. Lawrence Van Horn, Managerial Incentives in Nonprofit Organizations: 
Evidence From Hospitals, 45 J. L. & ECON. 227, 229 (2002).  But see Myron J. Roomkin & Burton A. 
Weisbrod, Managerial Compensation and Incentives in For-Profit and Nonprofit Hospitals, 15 J. L. ECON. & 
ORG. 750, 778 (1999) (finding that for-profits pay top executives more than not-for-profits do). 
 68. Sloan et al., supra note 61, at 13. 
 69. Richard Zeckhauser et al., The Economic Behavior of For-Profit and Nonprofit Hospitals: The 
Impact of Ownership on Responses to Changing Reimbursement and Market Environments (1995) 
(funded by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation) (on file with author). 
 70. Daniel Altman, Explaining Hospitals’ Investment Decisions (1999) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with author). 
 71. Frank & Salkever, supra note 15, at 195. 
 72. ELAINE SILVERMAN & JONATHAN SKINNER, ARE FOR-PROFIT HOSPITALS REALLY 
DIFFERENT? MEDICARE UPCODING AND MARKET STRUCTURE (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research Working 
Paper No. w8133, 2001), available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/w8133 (last visited July 19, 2003). 
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In addition, both per capita Medicare spending and increases in spending 
rates are higher in geographic areas served by for-profit hospitals than in those 
served by not-for-profit hospitals.73  Specific evidence demonstrating correlations 
between corporate form and decisions to establish post-acute facilities—which 
provide services that are costly for Medicare and have been profitable for hospi-
tals—supports the general evidence that for-profit hospitals generate higher 
Medicare costs than other types of hospitals.74  And, as part of a strategy to avoid 
low-paying patients, for-profit hospitals differentially locate near government 
hospitals, which disproportionately treat uninsured and poorly insured patients.75 
Even the financial literature remains incomplete.  A thorough evaluation 
of behavior should address how hospital types interact.76  For example, the 
aggressive billing tactics identified above may be copied by other hospitals in a 
market, further multiplying the costs to government.  There are a few theories 
regarding the effects of interactions within markets.  For example, Hansmann 
has argued that the presence of not-for-profit firms will deter profiteering of all 
firms in a market.77  David Cutler and I advanced a hypothesis, coined the 
“inverse Hansmann effect,” that for-profit hospitals often move first in markets 
and that not-for-profit and government hospitals copy the behavior of for-profit 
hospitals.78  This hypothesis is supported by some evidence in the empirical 
record.79  Not-for-profit hospitals adopt the billing procedures of for-profit 
hospitals that operate in their markets;80 and not-for-profit hospitals in heavily 
for-profit markets are more likely to engage in upcoding than are not-for-profit 
hospitals in other types of markets.81  In another domain, not-for-profit hospi-
tals that faced for-profit competition were more likely than other not-for-profits 
to respond to financial incentives to treat Medicaid patients under the California 
Disproportionate Share Program.82 
Knowing how different types of hospitals handle their finances and influ-
ence the financial behavior of competitors is important.  It is too early, 
however, to conclude that “nonprofit and for-profit hospitals do not vary 
                                                                                                                            
 73. Elaine M. Silverman et al., The Association Between For-Profit Hospital Ownership and 
Increased Medicare Spending, 341 NEW ENG. J. MED. 420, 424 (1999). 
 74. Altman, supra note 70. 
 75. Barro, supra note 37. 
 76. Weisbrod, supra note 8, at 78. 
 77. Hansmann, supra note 17, at 876. 
 78. David M. Cutler & Jill R. Horwitz, Converting Hospitals from Not-for-Profit to For-Profit 
Status: Why and What Effects?, in THE CHANGING HOSPITAL INDUSTRY, supra note 15, at 45. 
 79. Horwitz, supra note 19 (discussing market theories and offering new evidence regarding 
differential provision of services by market type). 
 80. Cutler & Horwitz, supra note 78, at 45–79. 
 81. SILVERMAN & SKINNER, supra note 72, at 16. 
 82. Duggan, supra note 38, at 433–46. 
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significantly in the provision of altruistic output.”83  Similar short-term finan-
cial behavior may result from different underlying hospital goals with vastly 
different implications for social welfare.  Hospitals that generate high profits, 
for example, could be doing so to enhance shareholder wealth or to offer future 
provision of high-quality care, subsidized care, or cushy working conditions.  
All hospitals likely pursue a mix of these goals, but order them differently; 
which goals take priority may have serious effects on social welfare. 
Even if we had more complete knowledge regarding the financial behavior 
of hospitals, it would not be sufficient to inform a choice among types.  Hospitals 
are primarily care providers and not financial institutions.  Any exclusive focus 
on differences in financial behavior would yield an incomplete picture of 
hospital behavior.  Instead, knowing how hospitals choose to invest in, maintain, 
and provide services is centrally important to evaluating the effects of corporate 
form on public welfare. 
Unfortunately, there are few studies on ownership and the quality of medi-
cal care and they focus on a small number of services and medical conditions.  
Some find no mortality differences.84  For example, one study concludes that 
“there is not a dime’s worth of difference” in terms of survival, changes in 
functional and cognitive status, and living arrangements for patients treated for 
hip fracture, stroke, coronary heart disease, and congestive heart failure at for-
profit and not-for-profit hospitals.85  Yet others demonstrate differences in post-
discharge mortality86 and morbidity.87  Gabriel Picone and coauthors find that 
one to two years after a hospital conversion to for-profit form, patient mortality 
increases and staffing decreases.  At the same time profits go up.88  Mark 
McClellan and Douglas Staiger observe higher mortality rates among elderly 
patients with heart disease in for-profit than in not-for-profit hospitals, although 
at least some of these differences may be explained by hospital location.89  In a 
recent meta-analysis of studies comparing mortality rates at not-for-profit and 
                                                                                                                            
 83. Brickley & Van Horn, supra note 67, at 243. 
 84. Stephen M. Shortell & Edward F.X. Hughes, The Effects of Regulation, Competition, and 
Ownership on Mortality Rates Among Hospital Inpatients, 318 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1100, 1103 (1988); 
Sloan et al., supra note 68, at 15; Frank Sloan, Hospital Ownership Conversions: Defining the Appropriate 
Public Oversight Role, in 5 FRONTIERS IN HEALTH POLICY RESEARCH 123 (Alan Garber ed., 2002). 
 85. Emmett B. Keeler et al., Hospital Characteristics and Quality of Care, 268 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 
1709, 1711–12 (1992) (finding no mortality differences by hospital types among Medicare patients 
treated for congestive heart failure, acute myocardial infarction, pneumonia, stroke, or hip fracture); 
Sloan, supra note 84; Sloan et al., supra note 68, at 19. 
 86. Arthur J. Hartz et al., Hospital Characteristics and Mortality Rates, 321 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
1720 (1989). 
 87. Sloan, supra note 84 (finding conversions to for-profit from not-for-profit or government 
form do not affect in-hospital mortality but do affect pneumonia complication rates). 
 88. Picone et al., supra note 28. 
 89. Mark McClellan & Douglas Staiger, Comparing Hospital Quality at For-Profit and Not-for-
Profit Hospitals, in THE CHANGING HOSPITAL INDUSTRY, supra note 15, at 93, 111. 
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for-profit hospitals, the authors show an association between for-profit status 
and an increased mortality risk.90 
This conflicting evidence is not surprising given that measuring healthcare 
quality is difficult, data are hard to collect, and some inputs related to quality 
such as the talent of paraprofessional staff are hard to observe.  Interpreting 
data and their connection to corporate form is further complicated because 
interactions among organizations may drive individual hospital behavior.  
Hospitals may provide community care, for example, only if other hospitals in 
the market do not provide it.91 
These difficulties do not mean that social scientists should close up shop.  
Nor do they mean that legal scholars should throw up their hands in the face 
of indeterminacy as David Hyman advocates.  Hyman poses the rhetorical 
question—“How does one value an open emergency room or burn unit?”92—to 
suggest that it is suspect to compare hospitals of different corporate forms 
based on community benefit measures. 
The difficulty in assigning value to corporate form does not mean that we 
cannot (or for that matter do not) do so.  For example, recent evidence suggests 
that interventions such as angioplasty are the most effective methods of heart 
attack treatment,93 yet the availability of angioplasty varies by corporate form 
of hospital.94  In addition, the availability of a service at the first hospital visited 
by a patient having a heart attack influences whether the patient receives the 
service95 and the size of the hospital is related to the quality of the treatment.96  
Using this information one could estimate a patient’s probability of receiving 
needed care given the corporate form of the nearest hospital.  That human 
lives are at stake gives us reason to do the hard work of estimating the costs and 
the benefits of corporate form.  We should not abandon the project because of 
technical difficulty or the value judgments involved in it. 
                                                                                                                            
 90. P.J. Devereaux et al., A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis of Studies Comparing Mortality 
Rates of Private For-Profit and Private Not-for-Profit Hospitals, 166 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 1399, 1402 (2002) 
(reporting relative risk = 1.020, 95 percent confidence interval 1.003–1.038, p=0.02). 
 91. See Richard G. Frank & David S. Salkever, The Supply of Charity Services by Nonprofit 
Hospitals: Motives and Market Structure, 22 RAND J. ECON. 430, 443–44 (1991). 
 92. Hyman, supra note 21, at 757. 
 93. Thomas Aversano et al., Thrombolytic Therapy vs Primary Percutaneous Coronary Intervention 
for Myocardial Infarction in Patients Presenting to Hospitals Without On-site Cardiac Surgery: A Randomized 
Controlled Trial, 287 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1943 (2002). 
 94. Horwitz, supra note 19. 
 95. Mark McClellan et al., Does More Intensive Treatment of Acute Myocardial Infarction in the 
Elderly Reduce Mortality?, 272 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 859 (1994). 
 96. David R. Thiemann et. al., The Association Between Hospital Volume and Survival After Acute 
Myocardial Infarction in Elderly Patients, 340 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1640, 1640–48 (1999). 
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III.   THE PROOF OF THE PUDDING: HOSPITAL BEHAVIOR AND GOALS 
This part reports and interprets new evidence that comparable hospitals of 
different types—not-for-profit, for-profit, and government—offer different 
types of medical services.  The findings imply that they implement different 
organizational goals.  Although specifying these goals is difficult, the evidence 
supports the theory that government hospitals are hospitals of last resort.  They 
are more likely than both other types to offer unprofitable services that are 
generally needed by poor, underinsured patients.  For-profits seek profits and 
avoid offering unprofitable services more than the others.  Not-for-profit 
hospitals are the intermediate type—while they are less responsive to financial 
incentives than are for-profits (both in offering profitable and avoiding unprof-
itable services), they are also less likely than similar government hospitals to 
offer unprofitable, undersupplied services.  These results belie predictions that 
not-for-profit hospitals will behave no differently than for-profit hospitals in 
the production of public goods when under financial pressure.97 
A. Description of the Project98 
Using data from the American Hospital Association’s Annual Survey99 
and the 1990 U.S. Census, I analyzed over thirty hospital services to determine 
whether hospitals of different types offer different services.  I first estimated a 
model of whether hospitals offer medical services as a function of corporate 
form and other controls.100  The controls were necessary because hospital 
                                                                                                                            
 97. Bloche, supra note 1, at 311–19; Hall & Colombo, supra note 25. 
 98. This section summarizes the findings of Horwitz, supra note 19. 
 99. The data come from the American Hospital Association’s Annual Surveys of Hospitals years 
1988 through 1998, inclusive.  These data include hospital size, ownership status, teaching status, 
admissions, location, services provided, and several measures of financial status.  All hospitals in the 
sample are nonrural, acute care hospitals that operate in Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) with at 
least two general medical and surgical hospitals.  In addition, some federally-run hospitals (military, 
uncategorized federal hospitals, and prison hospitals) were excluded. 
 100. The hypothesis is that the probability of offering a service is correlated with the organizational 
form of the hospital.  I estimate the following Probit model: Service* = βX + u where u ~ N (0,1).  Service 
= 1 if Service* > 0 and Service = 0 otherwise.  X = ßo + ß1 Formit + ß2 Yeart + ß3 Yeart*Formit + ß4 H + ß5 
D where FORM is a dummy variable for not-for-profit, for-profit, or government ownership; Year is a year 
dummy variable; H are hospital characteristic variables including hospital size (measured as quartiles of 
admissions), teaching status (measured by membership in the Council of Teaching Hospitals of the 
Association of American Teaching Hospitals), and a dummy variable for location by region in the country; 
D are demographic variables of the hospital’s vicinity, using 1990 Census data arranged by ten-mile 
radii around the centers of the hospitals’ zip codes (including percentages of the population by sex, 
white or African American race, ln household income, age categories (<1, 1–18, 18–30, 30–40, 40–50, 
50–65, ≥65, ≥80)).  I have assumed that the binary variable follows a binary distribution.  I adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity and allowed for an arbitrary covariance matrix within each hospital over time because 
the probability of a hospital offering a service is not independent from one year to the next.  By varying 
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characteristics vary considerably by hospital type and location.  For example, 
for-profits are smaller, less likely to be teaching hospitals, and more likely to be 
located in the south than are not-for-profits.  Many previous studies have not 
accounted for hospital, geographic, and demographic characteristics.101 
Determining what observed behavioral differences demonstrate about 
corporate intention is more difficult than establishing that the differences exist.  
Finding differences in behavior regarding one or two services, for example, 
would not provide enough evidence to infer motivation.  However, by looking 
at many services, grouped by characteristics such as profitability, one can rea-
sonably infer organizational goals.  Systematic investment in the most profit-
able services coupled with systematic avoidance of the least profitable services 
is behavior consistent with profit-seeking goals. 
To make these inferences, I categorized hospital services into three levels 
of profitability:102 high profitability (including cardiac care, diagnostic imaging 
procedures, orthopedic surgery), low profitability (including psychiatric emer-
gency care, AIDS/HIV services, alcohol and substance abuse inpatient and 
outpatient care, burn treatment, child and adolescent psychiatric services), 
and variable profitability (including post-acute services such as home health 
and skilled nursing).  The service groupings, summarized in Table 1, were based 
on interviews with hospital administrators and doctors, trade publications and 
healthcare business magazines, Medicare reimbursement guidelines, and an 
analysis of the insurance status of patients likely to need the service.  Because 
the project was concerned primarily with hospital behavior and motivation, I 
relied heavily on the subjective sources—interviews and the trade press reports 
to measure profitability.  I assumed that perceptions of whether a service would 
be profitable were likely more important determinants of hospital behavior 
than whether the service was, in fact, profitable.  However, there was remarka-
bly uniform agreement on the profitability category to which different services 
should be assigned. 
                                                                                                                            
only the corporate form of hospital while holding the independent variables constant at 1993 levels (or 
the next closest year in which 1993 data were unavailable), I predicted the probabilities that each 
hospital in each year would offer a given service. 
 101. Clark, supra note 1 (pointing out the difficulties of comparing hospital types because studies 
must adequately address hospital characteristic differences); Hansmann, supra note 17, at 867 n.93; cf. 
Weisbrod, supra note 8, at 76–77 (suggesting that characteristics such as hospital size may not be 
properly construed as exogenous to corporate form). 
 102. Details regarding the service groups and justifications for those groupings can be found in 
Horwitz, supra note 19 and technical appendices.  In addition, to test the theory that corporate 
differences are related to capital sources and capital need, I tested relative investment in services that 
required high levels of initial capital investment and those that did not.  I found no pattern to support 
the theory.  It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss these results. 
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TABLE 1: COMPARISON OF SERVICES OFFERED, % OF URBAN HOSPITALS  
OFFERING SERVICES AND PROFITABILITY STATUS (1988–1998) 
Service 
Mean (% 
hospitals 
offering 
service) Profitable Unprofitable
Variable 
Profits 
AIDS (Outpatient) (1988–93) 0.11  X  
AIDS Services (1994–98) 0.56  X  
AIDS Unit (1988–93) 0.04  X  
Alcohol/Drugs (Inpatient) (Beds > 1) 0.31  X  
Alcohol/Drugs (Outpatient) 0.33  X  
Angioplasty (1989–98) 0.39 X   
Birthing Room† 0.71 X   
Burn Treatment (Beds > 0) 0.05  X  
Cardiac Catheterization Lab 0.52 X   
CT Scanner 0.91 X   
Child Psychiatric Services† (Beds > 0) 0.26  X  
Diagnostic Radioisotope Facility 0.81 X   
Emergency Room 0.96  X  
Extracorporeal ShockWave Lithotripter (ESWL) 0.15 X   
Fitness Center 0.23 X   
HIV Test (1988–91) 0.60  X  
Home Health 0.44   X 
MRI 0.43 X   
Neonatal Intensive Care† (Beds >  0) 0.35 X   
Obstetrics (Beds > 2)† 0.71  X  
Obstetrics (Births ≥ 100)† 0.73  X  
Open Heart Surgery 0.33 X   
Orthopedic Surgery (1989–93) 0.92 X   
Pediatric Intensive Care Unit† (Beds > 1) 0.21 X   
Positron Emission Tomography (PET) (1990–98) 0.05 X   
Psychiatric (Inpatient) (Beds > 1) (1989–98) 0.47  X  
Psychiatric Emergency Services 0.48  X  
Skilled Nursing Facility 0.31   X 
Single Photon Emission Computerized Tomography 0.44 X   
Sports Medicine 0.30 X   
Trauma Center 0.23  X  
Ultrasound 0.95 X   
Women’s Center 0.43 X   
†excludes veterans’ hospitals. 
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B. Findings 
Comparing equivalent hospitals, for-profit hospitals were the most likely 
to offer relatively profitable services.  Government hospitals were the most 
likely to offer services that have high community need yet were undersupplied, 
attracted a poorly insured patient pool, and were not well-reimbursed by either 
government or private payers.  Not-for-profit hospitals often fell in the middle, 
providing more profitable services than government hospitals and more unprof-
itable services than for-profit hospitals. 
These findings do not mean that all for-profit hospitals are more likely than 
others to offer profitable services, or that all government hospitals are more 
likely than others to offer unprofitable services.  Large hospitals are more likely 
to have more of everything, and not-for-profit hospitals are larger than for-
profit and government hospitals.  So, not-for-profit hospitals offer more profit-
able and unprofitable services than both other types. 
The findings do mean that when comparing equivalent hospitals (for 
example, hospitals of the same size), for-profit status is strongly associated with 
offering relatively profitable services and not associated with offering unprofit-
able services.  Government status is strongly associated with offering unprofit-
able services.  Not-for-profit status is associated with intermediate behavior. 
Details on the empirical analysis of three representative services—a profit-
able service, an unprofitable service, and one of variable profitability—and 
summary results for the other services follow.  These patterns suggest that 
hospitals have different priorities. 
Representative Services.  Like almost all surgical services, cardiac services 
(for example, open heart surgery and cardiac catheterization labs) are widely 
known to be hospital profit centers.103  Cardiac services are well-reimbursed by 
insurers,104 supplied to a well-insured patient pool, and, during the study period, 
                                                                                                                            
 103. By 2000, cardiac treatments, along with orthopedics, led the niche hospital market.  For-profit 
Heart Hospital Leads to Showdown in Albuquerque, TODAY IN CARDIOLOGY, Sept. 1999, 
http://www.cardiologytoday.com/199909/bottom.asp (last visited July 19, 2003); Ann Japenga, Is a 
Luxury Hospital in Your Future?, http://www.usaweekend.com/00_issues/001029/001029hospitals.html 
(Oct. 29, 2000).  Niche hospitals often deprived local acute care hospitals of their most profitable business.  
Mike Gallagher, Bitter Medicine: Presbyterian Plans Painful for Doctor, ALBUQUERQUE J. (Mar. 10, 1998), 
1998 WL 11732874; Harris Meyer, Focused Factories: Are You Needy for the Competition?, HOSP. & 
HEALTH NETWORKS, Apr. 1998, http://www.hospitalconnect.com/jsp/article.jsp?dcrpath=AHA/ 
NewsStory_Article/data/HHNMAG1132&domain=HHNMAG. 
 104. David M. Cutler, et al., How Does Managed Care Do It?, 31 RAND J. ECON. 526 (2000); 
Telephone Interview with Troyen Brennan, President, Brigham and Women’s Hospital Physician 
Organization (Feb. 5, 2002). 
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exhibited stable or falling costs in real terms.105  Controlling for hospital and 
demographic characteristics, for-profit were more likely than not-for-profit 
hospitals and not-for-profit were more likely than government hospitals to offer 
these services.  The magnitude of these differences was large: On average, con-
trolling for hospital and demographic characteristics from 1988 to 1998, 39 
percent of for-profit hospitals were predicted to offer open heart surgery, com-
pared to 33 percent of not-for-profit hospitals and 27 percent of government 
hospitals.106  See Figure 1.  This evidence alone does not help to differentiate 
among possible goals of for-profit hospitals.  It could be that for-profits want to 
provide all services, or that for-profits might want to invest selectively in 
relatively profitable services. 
 
FIGURE 1: PROFITABLE SERVICE, OPEN HEART SURGERY 
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Probit predicted probabilities controlling for hospital, demographic, and geographic characteristics.  P 
values are based on the chi-square test of the differences between average predicted probability of 
offering services 1988–1998 (NFP v. FP: P < 0.001; NFP v. Gov: P = 0.001; FP v. Gov: P < 0.001). 
                                                                                                                            
 105. David M. Cutler & Robert S. Huckman, Technological Development and Medical Productivity: 
The Diffusion of Angioplasty, 22 N.Y. ST. J. HEALTH ECON. (2003) 187–217. 
 106. The null hypotheses that these averages are equal is rejected at the .001 level. 
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However, the pattern of service provision for a representative, unprofit-
able service was just the opposite.107  Psychiatric emergency services are unprof-
itable for several reasons.  They occur in the emergency room, an unprofitable 
setting;108 they involve psychiatric care, a service for which reimbursement is 
uncertain and often low relative to cost;109 and, they often attract a poorly 
insured, very sick population.110  Unlike open heart surgery, for-profits were less 
likely than equivalent not-for-profits, which in turn were less likely than gov-
ernment hospitals to offer this unprofitable service.  Again, comparing like 
hospitals, the magnitude was large: On average from 1988 to 1998, 40 percent 
of for-profit hospitals were predicted to offer psychiatric emergency services, 
compared to 47 percent of not-for-profit hospitals, and 55 percent of govern-
ment hospitals.111  See Figure 2. 
                                                                                                                            
 107. See generally Horwitz, supra note 19. 
 108. William Gentry & John Penrod, The Tax Benefits of Not-For-Profit Hospitals, in THE 
CHANGING HOSPITAL INDUSTRY, supra note 15, at 285, 295–96. 
 109. Medicaid: Louisiana Gov. Edwards Proposes 12 Percent Cut in Program Spending, BNA 
HEALTHCARE DAILY, Mar. 31, 1995. 
 110. Telephone Interview with Gary Gottlieb, President, Brigham and Women’s Hospital 
(Feb. 14, 2002). 
 111. The null hypotheses that these averages are equal is rejected at the 0.001 level. 
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FIGURE 2: UNPROFITABLE SERVICE, PSYCHIATRIC EMERGENCY SERVICES 
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Probit predicted probabilities controlling for hospital, demographic, and geographic characteristics.  P 
values are based on the chi-square test of the differences between average predicted probability of 
offering services 1988–1998 (NFP v. FP: P < 0.001; NFP v. Gov: P < 0.001; FP v. Gov: P < 0.001). 
 
Finally, variation in the profitability of post-acute services, such as home 
health and skilled nursing, makes them particularly useful services to test the 
relative responsiveness of hospitals to financial incentives.  Adjustments to 
the Medicare reimbursement system in the early to mid-1980s made post-acute 
services very profitable for hospitals, primarily because these services generated 
high reimbursements relative to acute care services.  Hospitals were also able to 
bill Medicare twice for the same patient, once for an acute care visit and again 
for a post-acute visit.112  The profitability of these services was widely under-
stood by hospital administrators and regulators alike.113 
                                                                                                                            
 112. For detailed discussion of Medicare reimbursement policies regarding acute care services, see 
JOSEPH P. NEWHOUSE, PRICING THE PRICELESS: A HEALTH CARE CONUNDRUM 28–37 (2002); Joseph 
P. Newhouse, Medicare, in AMERICAN ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE 1990S at 899 (Jeffrey A. Frankel & 
Peter R. Orszag eds., 2002). 
 113. Charles Helbing & Elizabeth S. Cornelius, Skilled Nursing Facilities, HEALTHCARE FIN. 
REV. 97 (1992 Annual Supplement); Charles Helbing et al., Home Health Agency Benefits, 
HEALTHCARE FIN. REV. 125 (1992 Annual Supplement); Nancy J. Scharmach, Diversifying into 
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Although regulators began searching for solutions to contain spending on 
post-acute services in the early 1990s,114 observers predicted that these services 
would remain profitable even if government payers capped reimbursement 
rates.115  With the passage of the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) in 1997, which 
imposed stringent limits on Medicare payments and system reforms, the profit-
making opportunities of post-acute care plummeted.116 
For-profit hospital provision of post-acute services tracked their profitabil-
ity to a remarkable degree.  See Figure 3.  Controlling for hospital, market, and 
demographic characteristics, the probability of offering home health services 
increased for all three types of hospitals when the service was profitable.  How-
ever, the growth of service provision among for-profit hospitals when the 
service was profitable and the corresponding decline when the service was 
unprofitable, were dramatic.  From 1988 to 1996, the probability of a for-profit 
hospital offering home health services grew 43 percentage points (from 17.5 
percent to 60.6 percent).  During the same period, the probability of offering 
the service grew almost 11 percentage points (from 40.8 percent to 51.5 per-
cent), for not-for-profits and almost 14 percentage points (from 38.1 percent to 
51.8 percent), for government hospitals.  From 1997 to 1998, as the service 
became relatively unprofitable with the implementation of the BBA, the 
probability of offering the service fell a striking 23 percentage points for for-
profits, fell 2 percentage points for not-for-profits, and grew 2 percentage points 
for government hospitals.  While additional years of data are needed to confirm 
the decrease in home healthcare with its decline in profitability, this finding 
provides evidence regarding the magnitude (large) and speed (fast) of for-profit 
responsiveness to incentives.117 
 
                                                                                                                            
Skilled Nursing Care: It Can Fill Beds, Manage Medicare Costs, and Meet a Need, MOD. 
HEALTHCARE, April 30, 1990, at 30; Lynn Wagner, Hospitals Seeing Benefits in Offering Long-Term 
Care, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Mar. 24, 1989, at 40–42. 
 114. Bruce C. Vladeck & Nancy A. Miller, The Medicare Home Health Initiative, 16 
HEALTHCARE FINANCING REV. 7 (1994). 
 115. Frances J. Fowler, Subacute Care Offers Flexibility, Revenue, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Oct. 26, 1992, 
at 50; Sandy Lutz, Home Care PPS Holds Promise of Profits, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Nov. 2, 1992, at 44; 
Sandy Lutz, Hospitals Continue Move into Home Care: Coming Changes in Reimbursement Expected to Promote 
Development of Programs Offering a Continuum of Care, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Jan. 25, 1993, at 28, 30–32; 
Kevin O’Donnell, Home Care Shaping Up as Competitive Necessity, MOD. HEALTHCARE, June 14, 1993, 
at 34. 
 116. See NEWHOUSE, supra note 112, at 33. 
 117. Cf. Mark G. Duggan, Hospital Ownership and Public Medical Spending, 115 Q.J. ECON. 1343, 
1359 (finding that not-for-profit and for-profit hospitals are similarly responsive to incentives). 
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FIGURE 3: VARIABLE PROFITS SERVICE, HOME HEALTHCARE 
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Probit predicted probabilities controlling for hospital, demographic, and geographic characteristics.  P 
values are based on the chi-square test of the differences between average predicted probability of 
offering services 1988–1998 (NFP v. FP: P < 0.001; NFP v. Gov: P = 0.416; FP v. Gov: P < 0.001). 
 
Summary Results for Other Services.  While details varied, many of the other 
tested services followed these patterns.  The results suggest that neither the 
profitmaking charitable divide (for-profits versus not-for-profit and government) 
nor the private/government divide (government versus for-profit and not-for-
profit) fully predict behavior.  Private ownership and charitable orientation 
both seem to matter.  As can be seen in Table 2, both types of private hospitals, 
not-for-profit and for-profit, are more likely to invest in profitable services than 
are comparable government hospitals.  For-profit hospitals are more likely than 
not-for-profits, and considerably more likely than government hospitals, to 
offer profitable services such as cardiac services, extracorporeal shock-wave 
Lithotripter (ESWL), and intensive care for neonates and children.  On the 
other hand, comparable not-for-profit and for-profit hospitals are equally likely 
to provide other profitable services (CT scanners, MRIs, orthopedic surgery, 
and sports medicine), but are both more likely to do so than similar hospitals. 
Not-for-profit orientation also seems to matter.  Government and not-for-
profit hospitals are both more likely than for-profits to offer the unprofitable 
services.  See Table 3.  Hospitals offer many types of AIDS services, outpatient 
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alcohol and substance abuse treatment, psychiatric emergency services, and 
trauma care.   
Further, the divide between for-profit hospitals and other types is particu-
larly evident in the patterns of service provision for variable-profit services.  As 
can be seen in Table 4, for-profits exhibited dramatic responsiveness to financial 
incentives, particularly in terms of investing in post-acute services as they 
became profitable and divesting from them as they became unprofitable. 
These results show that all three forms matter.  Not-for-profits are not a 
substitute for government hospitals in the provision of services disproportion-
ately demanded by needy patients, even though the two corporate forms are 
similar in being subjected to the nondistribution constraint.  Not-for-profit hospi-
tals are, however, more likely than for-profit hospitals to offer these unprofitable 
services.  Similarly, not-for-profits are not a substitute for for-profit hospital in the 
provision of profitable services.  They are less responsive to financial incentives. 
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TABLE 2:  SUMMARY OF RESULTS: PROFITABLE SERVICES 
PROFITABLE SERVICES F>NFP F>G NFP>G 
Angioplasty (1989–98) Y*** Y*** Y*** 
Birthing Room† N** Y*** Y*** 
Cardiac Catheterization Lab Y*** Y*** Y*** 
Computed Tomography Scanner (CT Scanner) = Y* Y** 
Diagnostic Radioisotope Facility N* Y*** Y*** 
Extracorporeal Shockwave Lithotripter Y*** Y*** Y*** 
Fitness Center N* Y Y*** 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging Y Y*** Y*** 
Neonatal Intensive Care† (Beds > 0) Y*** Y*** N*** 
Open Heart Surgery Y*** Y*** Y*** 
Orthopedic Surgery (1989–93) N Y*** Y*** 
Pediatric Intensive Care† (Beds > 1) Y*** Y*** N*** 
Positron Emission Tomography (1990–98) Y Y = 
Single Proton Emission Computed Tomography N*** Y Y*** 
Sports Medicine = Y*** Y*** 
Ultrasound N** N Y 
Women’s Center† Y*** Y*** Y* 
F = For-profit, NFP = Not-for-Profit, G = Government. 
† Excludes veterans’ hospital. 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. 
“=” if difference of predicted probability between firm types ≤ 0.003. 
Comparison between average probabilities from 1988–1998 unless noted. 
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TABLE 3:  SUMMARY OF RESULTS: UNPROFITABLE SERVICES 
UNPROFITABLE SERVICES F>NFP F>G NFP>G 
AIDS (Outpatient) (1988–93) N N*** N*** 
AIDS Services (1994–98) N*** N*** N*** 
AIDS Unit (1988–93) Y** N N*** 
Alcohol/Drug Inpatient (Beds > 1) Y*** Y* N*** 
Alcohol/Drug Outpatient N** N*** N*** 
Burn Treatment (Beds > 0) Y N* N*** 
Child/Adolescent Psychiatric† (Beds > 0) N N** N 
Emergency Room N* Y Y*** 
Emergency Room† N = Y 
HIV Test (1988–91) N N* N* 
Obstetrics (Beds > 2)† N N N 
Obstetrics (Births ≥ 100)† N*** N*** N 
Psychiatric Inpatient (Beds > 1) (1989–98) Y N*** N*** 
Psychiatric Emergency Services N*** N*** N*** 
Psychiatric Emergency Services† N*** N*** N 
Trauma Center N** N Y 
Trauma Center† N** N*** N*** 
F = For-profit, NFP = Not-for-Profit, G = Government. 
† excludes veterans’ hospital. 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10. 
“=” if difference of predicted probability between firm types ≤ 0.003. 
Comparison between average probabilities from 1988–1998 unless noted. 
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TABLE 4:  SUMMARY OF RESULTS: SERVICES WITH VARIABLE PROFITS 
When Profitable (1988–1996) When Unprofitable (1997–1998) 
 F NFP G F NFP G 
 Home Health ↑ 43 pts ↑ 11 pts ↑ 14 pts ↓ 23 pts ↓ 2 pts ↑ 2 pts 
 Skilled Nursing ↑ 43 pts ↑ 24 pts ↑ 12 pts ↓ 2 pts ↑ 2 pts ↑ 3 pts 
F = For-profit, NFP = Not-for-Profit, G = Government. 
Points measured as percentage points. 
 
The Legal Categories of Ownership.  To summarize, many scholars have 
sought to identify the defining characteristics of the not-for-profit sector.  Others 
have challenged the concept of the sector.118  This skepticism reflects a pre-
dominant strand of the economic literature regarding corporate form and 
hospital types.  For example, Sloan writes, “the evidence suggests that for-profit 
and private not-for-profit hospitals are far more alike than different.  If private 
not-for-profit hospitals are to distinguish themselves in terms of some nonpecu-
niary objective, they will have to define specifically what that focus is.”119  The 
evidence described here answers this challenge by demonstrating that not-for-
profit hospitals act differently in providing services, perhaps because they define 
and execute their missions differently. 
Thus far, I have argued that the legal categories of corporate form are 
strongly correlated with behavioral differences.  Different hospital purposes 
likely drive these results.  Before considering the policy implications of these 
results, I offer two potential explanations for these differences: the law and the 
ethics of not-for-profit organizations.  First, I review the laws that govern not-
for-profit corporations, arguing that they forbid not-for-profit organizations 
from adopting profitmaking as their primary goal.  I suggest that the laws 
themselves might shape corporate behavior.  Second, I outline a theory of 
moral responsibility for not-for-profits.  As with the laws that govern them, the 
moral responsibilities of not-for-profits are consistent with the behavioral 
differences described here, suggesting that they may have causal, as well as 
normative, force. 
                                                                                                                            
 118. Peter Dobkin Hall, A Historical Overview of Philanthropy, Voluntary Associations, and 
Nonprofit Organizations in the United States, 1600–2000, in Powell & Steinberg, THE NONPROFIT 
SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 2d ed. (forthcoming 2003), http://ksghome.harvard.edu 
/~phall.hauser.ksg/Powell%20Essay-Final%20-%20rev.pdf; Peter Dobkin Hall & Colin B. Burke, 
Historical Statistics of the United States Chapter on Voluntary, Nonprofit and Religious Entities and Volun-
tary Entities and Activities: Underlying Concepts, Concerns, and Opportunities, in HISTORICAL 
STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES (forthcoming 2003), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/delivery.cfm/ 
SSRN_ID352460_code021120590.pdf?abstractid=352460 (last visited July 15, 2003). 
 119. Sloan, supra note 30, at 1168. 
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IV.   THE LAW OF NOT-FOR-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS:  
REQUIRED OBJECTIVES 
Not-for-profit law derives from several doctrinal areas and all levels of 
government, including the common law of property and trusts,120 not-for-profit 
and business corporation state statutes, federal and state tax law, municipal 
property tax regulations, and state charities laws regarding fundraising.121  Not-
for-profits, including hospitals, are legally unique organizations because they are 
required to promote public purposes and are forbidden from distributing profits 
to private owners.  The conclusion presented above—that, at least relative to 
for-profits, not-for-profit hospitals do not offer services in order to profit—is 
consistent with legally permissible objectives.  This part presents a brief outline 
of these laws, particularly as applied to hospitals. 
Compared to many other areas of law, not-for-profit law is imprecise.  It is 
“poorly developed” relative to corporate law,122 has been weakened over the 
past few decades, and is often not enforced.  Not-for-profit directors, for example, 
are no longer held to stringent fiduciary duties found in trust law, but instead 
are governed by the looser duties of corporate directors that authorize consider-
able management leeway.  Yet, no area of governing law permits not-for-profits 
to behave like proprietary organizations, pursuing profits for their own sake or 
distributing profits to private individuals.123  The law unambiguously requires 
not-for-profits to pursue public goals.124 
Hospitals have been considered charities under common law since at least 
1572, when an act “was passed to assist benefactors who wished to found 
                                                                                                                            
 120. According to Marion Fremont-Smith, “[t]he rules concerning the dedication to public purposes 
applicable to charitable trusts are also applicable to charitable corporations and are construed without 
distinction as to the form of the charity.”  MARION FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT 
ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION (forthcoming 2004). 
 121. See generally id. (exhaustive account of charities law); JILL R. HORWITZ, STATE OVERSIGHT 
OF HOSPITAL CONVERSIONS: PRESERVING TRUST OR PROTECTING HEALTH? (Weiner Center for 
Social Policy, Working Paper No. H-98-03, 1998), available at http://www.ksghauser.harvard.edu/ 
useableknowledge/working_papers/working_papers.htm (discussing laws as applied to hospitals). 
 122. Hansmann, supra note 17, at 836. 
 123. See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT §§ 13.01–13.02 (1986) (nonprofit corpora-
tions are prohibited from making any distributions, except (a) mutual benefit corporations may purchase 
its own memberships under certain circumstances and (b) all nonprofit corporations upon dissolution in 
compliance with the dissolution provisions in the act); id. § 14.03 (regarding dissolution requires the 
dissolving corporation to give written notice to the attorney general regarding transfer of assets of a 
public benefit corporation upon dissolution); id. § 14.06(a)(6) (requiring dissolving public benefit 
corporations that do not have provisions for distribution of assets upon dissolution in the corporate 
articles or bylaws to comply with applicable Internal Revenue Code 501(c)(3) sections on transferring 
assets upon dissolution). 
 124. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 180, § 4(a)–(n) (West 2003). 
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hospitals and almshouses.”125  In the preamble to a 1597 “Act for erecting of 
hospitals or abiding and working houses for the poor,”126 gifts for “relief of aged, 
impotent and poor people” constituted permissible charities.127  In the United 
States, one of the Supreme Court’s earliest pronouncements on the character-
istics of corporate entities, Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward,128 
identified hospitals as the canonical charitable institution, one that is both 
private and charitable.129  More recently, British common law has clarified 
that the provision of medical care itself, regardless of whether a patient pays for 
the care, is a legitimate charitable activity.130  American law has followed this 
approach, defining the prevention and treatment of disease as charitable behav-
ior regardless of whether a patient pays for the care.131  Contemporary charities 
statutes echo the common law history. 
A. State Law—Incorporation and Related Duties 
State laws require not-for-profit organizations to be created and operated to 
advance public purposes, though they are not required to adopt any particular 
public purposes.132  While the specifics vary by state, not-for-profits must file a 
certificate of incorporation with the state, which specifies its not-for-profit 
                                                                                                                            
 125. MARION FREMONT-SMITH, FOUNDATIONS AND GOVERNMENT: STATE AND FEDERAL 
LAW AND SUPERVISION (1965) (citing Stat. 14 Eliz. I, c.11 (1572)). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Preamble to the Statute of Charitable Uses, 43 Eliz., C. 4 (1601 Eng.); see id. (noting that 
this preamble was identical to the more famous preamble to the Statute of Charitable Uses). 
 128. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). 
 129. Id. at 563. 
 130. L.A. SHERIDAN & GEORGE W. KEETON, THE MODERN LAW OF CHARITIES 143 (3d ed. 
1983) (citing In re Resch’s Will Trusts, [1969] 1 A.C. 514, 540 (per Lord Wilberforce), “[T]he provision 
of medical care for the sick is, in modern times, accepted as a public benefit suitable to attract the 
privileges given to charitable institutions.”).  In addition, L.A. Sheridan concludes that, “Hospitals have 
been consistently held charitable.”  Id. at 144.  Some have been voluntary organizations offering their 
treatment for free.  Further, “[t]he charitable status of a hospital devoted to paying patients seems to be 
finally established by In re Resch’s Will trusts,” which involved a gift to a hospital that offered acute care 
services, primarily to paying patients, and to some patients at no or reduced fees.  Id. at 169–70.  Lord 
Wilberforce, on behalf of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, advised as follows:  
A gift for the purpose of a hospital is prima facie a good charitable gift.  This is now clearly estab-
lished both in Australia and in England, not merely because of the use of the word ‘impotent’ 
in the preamble to 43 Eliz. c. 4, though the process of referring to the preamble is one often 
used for reassurance, but because the provision of medical care for the sick is, in modern times, 
accepted as a public benefit suitable to attract the privileges given to charitable institutions. 
Id. (quoting In re Resch’s Will Trusts, [1969] 1 A.C. at 540). 
 131. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 372 cmt. b (1959). 
 132. In rejecting Colombo and Hall’s donative theory of tax exemption, Seay has forcefully 
argued that charities law addresses procedure, not outcomes.  Seay, supra note 29, at 36. 
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status and purpose,133 and possibly limits the scope of authority to deviate from 
that mission. 
The range of permissible purposes is broad.134  Some states, as well as the 
Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act,135 allow organizations to specify 
“the transaction of any lawful activity” as their organizational goal.136  Other 
statutes identify an extensive list of particular activities.  According to the 
Massachusetts nonprofit code, for example, a nonprofit corporation may “be 
formed for any one or more of the following purposes: 
(a) for any civic, educational, charitable, benevolent or religious purpose; 
(b) for the prosecution of any antiquarian, historical, literary, scientific, 
medical, chiropractic, artistic, monumental or musical purpose; (c) for 
establishing and maintaining libraries; (d) for supporting any missionary 
enterprise having for its object the dissemination of religious or educa-
tional instruction in foreign countries; (e) for promoting temperance or 
morality in the commonwealth; (f) for fostering, encouraging or engaging 
in athletic exercises or yachting; (g) for encouraging the raising of choice 
breeds of domestic animals and poultry; (h) for the association and accom-
modation of societies of Free Masons, Odd Fellows, Knights of Pythias or 
other charitable or social bodies of a like character and purpose; (i) for 
the establishment and maintenance of places for reading rooms, libraries 
or social meetings; (j) for establishing boards of trade, chambers of 
commerce and bodies of like nature; (k) for providing nonprofit credit 
counseling services . . . ; (l) for encouraging agriculture or horticulture; 
for improving and ornamenting the streets and public squares of any city 
or town by planting and cultivating ornamental trees therein and also 
otherwise improving the physical aspects of such city or town and 
furthering the recreation and enjoyment of the inhabitants thereof; (m) 
for the purpose of purchasing, holding, preserving and maintaining burial 
                                                                                                                            
 133. In all states, charitable organizations can choose whether to operate as a not-for-profit corpo-
ration or a charitable trust.  I focus on not-for-profit corporations because charitable hospitals use this 
form.  By 2002, forty-eight states and the District of Columbia had enacted nonprofit corporation acts; 
twenty-one states adopted the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act.  FREMONT-SMITH, supra 
note 120. 
 134. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 180, § 4(a)–(n) (West 2003); Brody, supra note 3, at 
441–45, 478 (discussing the history of public purposes in state charities law). 
 135. REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 3.01(a) (1988) (“Every corporation incorporated 
under this Act has the purpose of engaging in any lawful activity unless a more limited purpose is set 
forth in the articles of incorporation.”); id. § 2.02(b) (“The articles of incorporation may set forth: (1) 
the purpose or purposes for which the corporation is organized, which may be, either alone or in combi-
nation with other purposes, the transaction of any lawful activity.”). 
 136. In Delaware and Kansas, the two states that do not have not-for-profit corporations statutes 
certificates of incorporation may include “any lawful purpose” as the corporate purpose.  DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 8, § 102(a)(3) (West 2002); KAN. CORP. CODE ANN. § 17-6002(3) (West 2001). 
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grounds. . . ; (n) for establishing a not-for-profit association of employers 
as authorized by [another section].137 
Although finding a coherent rationale for this list would prove difficult,138 
the list leaves out some purposes available to business corporations, such as earn-
ing profits or distributing them.  In practice, however, federal tax law rather than 
state corporations law effectively restricts the permissible range of activity.  Not-
for-profit corporations must specify their public purposes with more particularity 
for federal income tax exemption than for state incorporation.139 
The ultra vires doctrine, which forbids corporations from exceeding legis-
latively authorized power, may also constrain not-for-profits.140  Long considered 
dead in the for-profit context,141 the doctrine represents another limitation on 
not-for-profit purposes.  In one recent application, the state of Michigan sought 
to revoke the corporate charter of a not-for-profit hospital that had attempted 
to move substantially all its assets to a subsidiary jointly owned by a for-profit 
corporation.  The state alleged that the joint venture constituted an ultra vires 
act in violation of the state’s not-for-profit statute and the hospital’s corporate 
mission, and the court granted summary judgment for the state.142 
B. State Law—Fiduciary Duties 
All corporate directors are subject to the duties of loyalty and care.  The 
corporate duty of loyalty, now commonly known as the duty of fair dealing, 
requires directors to put the corporation’s interests before their private interests 
whenever the two conflict.143  The duty of care requires directors and officers to 
“exercise that degree of skill, diligence, and care that a reasonably prudent 
person would exercise in similar circumstances.”144 
The standards for directors of charitable trusts are more stringent than for 
directors of business corporations.  Under trust law, the duty of loyalty prohibits 
                                                                                                                            
 137. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 180, § 4(a)–(n) (West 2003). 
 138. See also Hansmann, supra note 39, at 509–11 (arguing that nonprofit law is confusing and dis-
cussing the lack of a coherent rationale for permissible purposes in charity law and difficulty the drafters 
faced in defining those purposes in the Model Nonprofit Corporation Act). 
 139. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2002); see also TREAS. REG. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (1996). 
 140. 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 573 (1990). 
 141. Cf. Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegality (With 
Notes on How Corporate Law Could Reinforce International Law Norms), 87 VA. L. REV. 1279 (2001) 
(arguing that the doctrine limits the profit-seeking behavior of for-profit business corporations such that 
they need be concerned with the human rights and social welfare laws of all jurisdictions in which they 
do business). 
 142. Opinion and Order at 3, Kelley v. Michigan Affiliated Healthcare System, Inc. (Mich. St. 
Ct. 1997 (No. 96-83848-CZ) (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.3601 (West 1996); MICH. STAT. 
ANN. § 27A.3601 (Callaghan 1996) (against unauthorized exercise of corporate rights)). 
 143. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 120 (citing Winter v. Anderson, 275 N.Y.S. 373 (1934)). 
 144. ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 123 (1986). 
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any self-dealing where conflicts of interest arise unless modified by terms of the 
trust, whereas business directors are permitted to engage in fair self-dealing.  
Under trust law, the duty of care requires trustees to exercise oversight of the 
trusts’ affairs as would a prudent person managing his own affairs, whereas busi-
ness directors can deviate from this standard when exercising their “business 
judgment,” in which case the court grants considerable deference to the deci-
sionmaker.  Under this standard, the “business judgment of the directors will 
not be challenged or overturned by courts or shareholders, and the directors 
will not be held liable for the consequences of their exercise of business 
judgment,” even if that judgment was mistaken.145 
While courts traditionally held not-for-profit directors to the trust standards 
of care and loyalty, the modern trend is to apply business corporation standards.  
In 1974, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia confirmed this 
trend in the Sibley Hospital case.146  The case has been widely followed, and now 
a majority of states have adopted the modern duty in their statutes.147  Despite 
widespread objection,148 the current duty of loyalty for not-for-profit directors 
allows self-dealing as long as “a disinterested majority of the board approves the 
transaction and the contract itself is fair.”149  The trust duty of care applies in 
the not-for-profit context, but the liberal business judgment rule also applies.150  
These changes, coupled with the increasing commercialization of not-for-profit 
hospitals,151 have raised questions regarding the appropriateness of the not-for-
profit corporate form and tax exemptions for hospitals.152 
In sum, “[n]onprofit corporation law cedes a great deal of autonomy 
to founders and directors of charitable corporations, a level of discretion 
that trustees can match only if granted by the founder in the settlement 
                                                                                                                            
 145. Id. 
 146. Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat’l Training Sch. for Deaconesses and Missionaries, 381 F. 
Supp. 1003, 1014–15 (D.D.C. 1974). 
 147. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 120. 
 148. See, e.g., FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 125; James J. Fishman, The Development of Nonprofit 
Corporation Law and an Agenda for Reform, 34 EMORY L.J. 617, 645–50 (1985); Hansmann, supra note 
39, at 567–74; Kenneth L. Karst, The Efficiency of the Charitable Dollar: An Unfulfilled State Responsibility, 
73 HARV. L. REV. 433, 435–36 (1960). 
 149. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 120 (citing Note, The Fairness Test of Corporation Contracts 
with Interested Directors, 61 HARV. L. REV. 335 (1948)); HENRY WINTHROP BALLANTINE, THE LAW OF 
CORPORATIONS § 67 (1946). 
 150. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 120. 
 151. See Frank A. Sloan, Commercialism in Nonprofit Hospitals, 17 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 
234 (1998). 
 152. Burton A. Weisbrod, The Nonprofit Mission and Its Financing, 17 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS AND 
MGMT. 165 (1998).  The commercialization of not-for-profits is not a new area of concern.  Stephen 
Schwarz has documented challenges to not-for-profit tax exemption that date back to the 1940s.  
Stephen Schwarz, Federal Income Taxation of Investments by Nonprofit Organizations: Beyond a 
Primer, at 1–2 (2000) (unpublished manuscript on file with author). 
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instrument.”153  However, the special goals of not-for-profits impose distinct 
duties on not-for-profit trustees and directors.  They must guide the organiza-
tions to be in the business of pursuing their charitable purposes as opposed to 
profits per se. 
C. Tax Exemption 
Not-for-profit corporations are generally exempt from income taxes and 
property taxes.  Although tax exemption is not the focus of this Article,154 it is 
important for understanding not-for-profits.  The underlying theory for income 
and property tax exemptions has been widely disputed, particularly regarding 
whether the exemption is a tax payment for a benefit or a subsidy for an 
otherwise desirable activity.155  Despite many years of political, academic, and 
popular attention to whether not-for-profits merit tax exemption, we do not 
know the extent to which the tax exemption explains not-for-profit behavior.  
We do know that on its face the exemption lends at least symbolic force to the 
common law requirement that not-for-profits act in pursuit of their missions 
rather than profitmaking and provides some incentive to comply with it. 
Hospitals are presumptively eligible for federal income tax exemption.  
State income and property tax exemption statutes generally follow the federal 
income tax code in exempting healthcare delivery as an inherently charitable 
activity, but a few states require additional evidence of charitable character 
such as the delivery of free care.156  The value of tax exemptions to hospitals 
varies considerably because hospitals differ in terms of “profitability, capital 
intensity, state corporate tax rates,” and investments.157  Using data from the 
mid-1990s, William Gentry and John Penrod estimated the aggregate annual 
value of the exemptions to be $4.6 billion for state and federal income tax 
exemptions, $1.7 billion for property tax exemption, $354 million for access to 
tax-exempt bonds, and $1.1 billion for donor income tax deductions.158  To put 
                                                                                                                            
 153. Brody, supra note 3, at 475 (citing in general Evelyn Brody, The Limits of Charity Fiduciary 
Law, 57 MD. L. REV. 1400 (1998)). 
 154. Tax exemption has been discussed extensively elsewhere.  See, e.g., Fischer, supra note 45; 
Hall & Colombo, supra note 25; Roska, supra note 40; Simon, supra note 49; Wood, supra note 24. 
 155. Evelyn Brody, Introduction to PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES: MAPPING THE 
BATTLEFIELD ix, xvi (Evelyn Brody ed., 2002). 
 156. Hall & Colombo, supra note 25, at 320–28. 
 157. William M. Gentry & John R. Penrod, The Tax Benefits of Not-for-profit Hospitals, in THE 
CHANGING HOSPITAL INDUSTRY, supra note 15, at 285, 286. 
 158. Id. at 286–87. The property tax exemptions may be underestimated because if not-for-profit 
organizations were to lose their property tax exemptions, municipalities would have an incentive to 
place higher values on the property.  On the other hand, the value of income tax exemptions may be 
overestimated because hospitals would deduct property taxes and other expenses that they may not now 
deduct.  I thank Marion Fremont-Smith for noting these complications to predicting taxes. 
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these numbers in context, consider the $412 billion of annual hospital 
revenues cited above, or the $363.8 billion spent in fiscal year 1998 on interest 
payments on the national debt.159 
1. Federal Tax Law 
While tax exemption is granted on a case-by-case basis to individual hospi-
tals,160 virtually all not-for-profit, acute care hospitals have federal tax exemption.  
Federal income tax exemption for not-for-profit corporations and deductibility 
for contributions to them is granted to: 
Corporations . . . organized and operated exclusively for religious, chari-
table, scientific, . . . or educational purposes . . . no part of the net earnings 
of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, 
no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or 
otherwise attempting, to influence legislation . . . , and which does not 
participate in, or intervene in . . . any political campaign . . . .161 
This statute, Internal Revenue Code section 501(c)(3), and its accompanying 
regulations, constrain the purposes and activities of tax-exempt organizations.  
Accordingly, a hospital’s articles of incorporation must not contain express 
powers that would allow a not-for-profit to engage substantially in activities 
that do not further exempt purposes.162  Even if states do not restrict not-for-
profit corporate purposes and the distribution of profits specifically, federal tax 
law requires that not-for-profits operate for the public benefit and refrain from 
distributing profits.163 
As evidence of charitable orientation and activity, the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) has required not-for-profit hospitals to engage in specific 
charitable activities.  These requirements have changed over time from per se 
exemption, to a narrow focus on poverty relief, then to a broader concept of 
community benefit.  In 1956, the IRS required tax-exempt hospitals to treat 
indigent patients free of charge.164  The creation of large public payer programs 
in 1965 reduced the need for free services, and starting in 1969 the IRS 
                                                                                                                            
 159. Interest Expense on the Debt Outstanding, available at http://www.publicdebt.treas.gov/opd/ 
opdint.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2003). 
 160. BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 122–23 (7th ed. 1998) 
(citing Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 29 (1976)). 
 161. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2002). 
 162. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 120 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(b) (1)(b)). 
 163. Although some states allow not-for-profit corporations to be stock corporations (for exam-
ple, Delaware and Kansas not-for-profits incorporate under the business corporation code), it is not 
accepted practice to do so and the federal income tax exemption laws do not allow it. Id.  Similarly, 
although some states allow the transfer of assets to for-profit corporations upon dissolution, treasury 
regulations require that the assets be distributed to other section 501(c)(3) organizations.  Id. 
 164. Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202. 
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allowed not-for-profit hospitals to maintain federal income tax exemption 
by operating an emergency room open to all patients, regardless of payment 
status.165  The requirement was again altered in 1983 when the IRS exempted 
hospitals operating in areas with sufficient emergency room access.166  The effect 
of this revision is unclear, because Congress requires hospitals participating in 
Medicare that have emergency facilities (as almost all do) to stabilize emer-
gency patients regardless of ability to pay.167 
Though not binding, IRS guidelines issued in 1992 stated that tax-exempt 
hospitals should have open medical staffs, a full-time emergency room for all 
those in need, nonemergency care for those who can pay, and governing boards 
that include prominent civic leaders rather than primarily hospital administra-
tors and doctors.168  Since the early 1990s Congress has considered, but not 
passed, several proposals to require charity care in exchange for tax exemption.169 
2. State Property Taxation: Narrowing the Definition of Charitable Activity 
State constitutions, statutes, and case law guide the scope and application 
of property tax exemption for charitable organizations.  State statutes generally 
exempt particular categories of not-for-profit organizations such as churches, 
schools, and other charitable organizations.  Some exemption statutes list 
hospitals and other more specific types of organizations by function.170  Others 
identify corporations by name.171 
In practice,  
[s]tates generally may be divided into those that base their rationale for 
tax exemption on the principle that charities relieve a government 
burden and those that accept the rationale that exemption is granted 
                                                                                                                            
 165. See Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117; see also E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 
F.2d 1278, 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1974), vacated by 426 U.S. 26 (1976), noting: 
Revenue Ruling 69-545 rather than overruling Revenue Ruling 56-185 simply provides an alter-
native method whereby a nonprofit hospital can qualify as a tax exempt charitable organization.  
That method entails the operation of an emergency room open to all regardless of their ability 
to pay and providing hospital services to those able to pay the cost either directly or through 
third party reimbursement.  Thus, to qualify as a tax exempt charitable organization, a hospital 
must still provide services to indigents. 
Id. 
 166. Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1983-2 C.B. 94. 
 167. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd. 
 168. Announcement 92-83, 1992-22 I.R.B. 59 (IRS Audit Guidelines for Hospitals). 
 169. Brody, supra note 3, at 479 (citing JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 102D CONG., 1ST 
SESS., PROPOSALS AND ISSUES RELATING TO THE TAX EXEMPT STATUS OF NOT-FOR-PROFIT 
HOSPITALS INCLUDING DESCRIPTIONS OF H.R. 1374 AND H.R. 790, at 13–22 (Comm. Print 1991)); 
Colombo & Hall, Tax-Exemption, supra note 39, at 1–2. 
 170. 2002 Ariz. Legis. Serv. Ch. 174 (S.B. 1290) (West); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 42-11105 (2002). 
 171. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58.1-3650.1–.1001 (Michie 2002). 
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because the work of the charity confers a benefit on the community.  
States that strictly apply the government burden rationale generally 
apply more stringent criteria.172 
Although the benefit that communities receive in exchange for granting prop-
erty tax exemptions to not-for-profit hospitals could be tested in many ways, 
scholars, policymakers, and courts have often identified charitable service 
provision as a central, often dispositive, marker of community benefit.173 
Facing shrinking access to federal funds, a small number of state and 
municipal governments have required not-for-profit hospitals to justify their tax 
exemptions.174  Some states have required community service,175 or minimum 
levels of uncompensated care from not-for-profit providers.176  Some munici-
palities have negotiated payments in lieu of taxes from not-for-profit hospitals.177  
Most states, however, follow the common law in exempting charities per se.178 
As with any other legal regime, the effectiveness of the laws governing not-
for-profits depends on enforcement.  Few attorneys general, the only authorities 
with oversight powers, have adequate resources to or interest in overseeing not-
for-profits.179  The IRS has regulatory authority at the federal level, but that 
authority is also practically limited.  The IRS’s tax-exempt organizations division 
                                                                                                                            
 172. Janne Gallagher, The Legal Structure of Property-Tax Exemption, in PROPERTY TAX 
EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES, supra note 155, at 3, 10. 
 173. See, e.g., Simpson & Strum, supra note 39, at 647–49 nn.63, 65 (listing state cases and 
statutes dealing with hospital property tax exemption and charity care). 
 174. Margaret A. Potter & Beaufort B. Longest, Jr., The Divergence of Federal and State Policies on 
the Charitable Tax Exemption of Nonprofit Hospitals, 19 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 393, 393–94 (1994); 
see also Brody, supra note 155, at xii (identifying the growing domain of charitable activity and the 
increasing similarity of not-for-profit and for-profit activities as the causes of shrinking public support for 
tax exemptions). 
 175. See, e.g., Utah County v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 709 P.2d 265, 278 (Utah 1985); 
Allentown Hosp.-Lehigh Valley Hosp. Ctr. v. Bd. of Assessment Appeals Lehigh County, 611 A.2d 
793, 797 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992); Howell v. County Bd. of Cache County, ex rel. IHC Hosps., Inc., 881 
P.2d 880, 890 (Utah 1994) (upholding the constitutionality of the Utah Commission’s standards for 
exempting charitable hospitals from property taxation). 
 176. Gallagher, supra note 172, at 12. 
 177. Med. Ctr. Hosp. of Vt., Inc. v. City of Burlington, 566 A.2d 1352 (Vt. 1989). 
 178. See Alice A. Noble et al., Charitable Hospital Accountability: A Review and Analysis of Legal 
and Policy Initiatives, 26 J. L., MED., & ETHICS 116 (1998); Potter & Longest, supra note 174.  For 
example, Arizona exempts not-for-profit hospitals from property taxes as a matter of statute.  2002 Ariz. 
Legis. Serv. Ch. 174 (S.B. 1290) (West); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 42-11105 (2002). 
 179. See, e.g., Horwitz, supra note 121 (discussing the role of attorneys general in overseeing not-
for-profit hospital conversions and presenting empirical data on attorneys general knowledge about 
enforcement powers and capability of using them); FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 120 (discussing state 
regulation of charities, attorneys general powers, and enforcement tools; noting that states with the larg-
est populations have active attorneys general); Brody, supra note 3, at 481–82, 499 (outlining over forty 
years of criticism regarding enforcement of state charities law). 
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oversees taxation and has constrained resources and tools to monitor not-for-
profit behavior.180 
On their face, the laws require not-for-profits to adopt public benefit goals.  
Whether these laws cause differences in behavior is uncertain.  The legal regime 
may influence not-for-profits through any number of paths, such as attracting 
managers who approve of the legal constraints.  Employees may use the laws to 
establish the social identity of the organization, attributing public mindedness 
to not-for-profits and using this identity to persuade colleagues to forgo profits 
for the public good.181  The laws may also be important because they identify a set 
of organizations about which there are common social expectations,182 expecta-
tions that are enforced through informal mechanisms such as norms183 as well as 
through the law.  That the corporate objectives implied by the findings here are 
legally required objectives suggests that the law is at work. 
V.   THE ETHICAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF CORPORATE FORM: 
OUTLINING THE DUTY OF INTEGRITY 
Hospitals have many moral obligations.  Some are associated with the 
goods they provide.  Others stem from their roles as employers, neighbors, or 
public contractors.  Most do not depend on who exercises residual corporate 
control over or manages the hospital.  When it comes to moral duties associ-
ated with providing healthcare, it does not matter whether a hospital is owned 
by institutional shareholders or operated by nuns.  All hospitals, for example, 
must provide emergency services to those in need, under certain conditions.  
There are other moral obligations that are associated with corporate form per 
se.  For these, ownership matters and the stakes are high. 
My argument is, in part, positive.  The moral requirements outlined here 
track the behavioral differences described above, and could be causal.  While I 
do not answer the question here, it would be useful to learn the extent to which 
the law, legal benefits, morality, social norms, or some interaction of these 
cause not-for-profit behavior.  Understanding why corporations make the 
choices they do would help in designing effective law and associated subsidies.  
If moral, rather than legal, requirements explain decisionmaking, perhaps we 
should not worry that not-for-profit law is so imprecise and poorly enforced. 
                                                                                                                            
 180. Marion R. Fremont-Smith, Current Proposals for Public Charity Intermediate Sanctions, 10 
EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 115 (1994) (the introduction of intermediate sanctions expanded the ability of 
the IRS to address conflicts of interest). 
 181. See Marilyn Brewer & Wendi Gardner, Who Is This “We”? Levels of Collective Identity and 
Self-Representations 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCH. (1996) (discussing the mechanisms by which 
individuals and groups establish identities). 
 182. Brody, supra note 3, at 461–65. 
 183. Hansmann, supra note 17, at 875–76. 
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The argument here is also normative.  We want some hospitals to hold 
the moral duties associated with not-for-profit status, or at least behave as if 
they do.  If these responsibilities are causal, at least some hospitals should adopt 
the not-for-profit form.184  And, even if not-for-profit hospitals do not realize 
their moral obligations, they ought to. 
Before turning to the institutional ethics of not-for-profit hospitals, it is 
worth considering two matters.  First, why should we be concerned with these 
ethics?  Why not monitor the behavior of all hospitals and forgo reliance on their 
self-governing ethics altogether? 
The ethics of healthcare organizations are instrumentally important.  
Because we cannot observe some crucial measures of quality and access to 
care—for example, medical treatment outcomes, doctor skill, or patient 
comfort—we cannot contract for them.185  We should continue searching for 
better methods to observe subtle determinants of quality, find effective ways to 
contract for them, monitor their provision, and enforce the contracts when 
necessary.  But no matter how good we get at any of these steps, complete 
contracting would remain impossible and comprehensive contracting would be 
expensive.  And, as a practical matter, government regulators often play catch-
up with regulated parties.  We will always need to trust hospitals because they 
will always exercise some discretion over patient care. 
Second, is the concept of institutional morality coherent?  Whether the 
ethics discussed below are ethics of corporations or of the individuals associated 
with them has little practical significance for my argument.  In this context, how-
ever, I think that concentrating on organizational ethics makes sense.  Of course, 
individuals such as officers, managers, doctors, and nurses hold duties, maybe 
even the duty to enable the organization to fulfill its responsibilities.  However, 
aggregating these individual duties would not sufficiently capture the institu-
tional responsibilities that I outline below. 
But, can organization hold moral duties?  The answer is complicated and 
controversial.  In brief, I believe an organization can do so because once 
formed, it constitutes an agency that is distinct from the aggregation of indi-
viduals associated with it.  There are several characteristics that contribute to 
our intuitive understanding that corporations are real things, existing beyond the 
collection of people who populate them, such as: an ongoing identity that 
outlives a particular group of employees, a complex decisionmaking structure, 
                                                                                                                            
 184. There are stronger claims to be made about corporate morality.  It could be that not-for-profits 
pursue the public interest because that is the right thing to do.  In other words, morality itself can cause 
behavior.  See, e.g., Joshua Cohen, The Arc of the Moral Universe, 26 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 91, 91–92 
(1997) (arguing that slavery fell because it was unjust). 
 185. I am grateful to Melissa Lane for the many conversations we have had regarding the 
contours of and need for institutional ethics. 
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large size and anonymity, formal relationships, the capability of holding 
resources, and a shared mission.186  They can cause outcomes, and they can 
intend actions.187 
Because some of the problems of attributing moral responsibility to 
organizations are similar to those of attributing moral responsibility to people, 
we can learn from the analogy.  Philosophers have long struggled with personal 
identity and responsibility because, among other reasons, people adopt contra-
dictory agendas or can change so dramatically that they are not recognizable as 
the same person.188  Discussing this divided selves problem, Christine Korsgaard 
claims that the acceptable reasons for considering oneself to be a rational, 
unified agent at any given time are practical rather than metaphysical.  Regard-
less of internal conflict (emotional, intellectual, or nerve conflict such as when 
the two hemispheres of the brain function separately), an individual is “a unified 
person at any given time because you must act, and you have only one body with 
which to act.”189 
Since organizations are not people and do not have bodies, there is not the 
same imperative to find a solution to the problem of attributing moral responsi-
bility to them.  But there may be similarly practical reasons for assigning moral 
                                                                                                                            
 186. See, e.g., MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS: A LEGAL THEORY 
FOR BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY (1986) (discussing how preferences and decisionmaking can be 
attributed to organizations and may not be traceable to any individual or group). 
 187. Some of the literature on social groups is useful for understanding organizations.  See, e.g., 
MARGARET GILBERT, ON SOCIAL FACTS 204 (1989) (investigating the common concepts of social groups 
and how they incorporate the concept of a plural subject); J. David Velleman, How to Share an Intention, 
57 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 29, 31 (1997).  Proceeding farther than Gilbert in arguing that 
plural subjects can combine to make a single subject, Velleman shows how the distinct intentions of 
individuals “can add up to a single token of intention, jointly held” without resorting to the strange 
ideas like collective minds.  Id.  Velleman offers an example of how this can happen.  When one person 
says to another, “I’ll take a walk if you will,” the speaker implicitly conveys that she will be prompted to 
take a walk if the other says “I will.”  Id. at 46.  When the second person says “I will,” the statements 
 combine to form a joint statement saying, in effect, that they will jointly prompt us to take a 
walk; and they jointly prompt us to take a walk, as they jointly say.  They consequently add up to 
a single representation that causes our actions by representing itself as causing them—a single 
token intention that is literally shared between us.  
Id. at 47.  Whether organizations can form intentions and hold responsibilities in a manner analogous 
for groups raises a related, but different, question.  In the case of hospitals, for example, it could be that 
individuals and groups of employees hold obligations such as keeping the hospital open to serve those in 
need.  But, what if no one or no group wishes to work at the hospital?  The employees, individual and as a 
group, may have an obligation to work for some time.  But, since we do not wish to enslave them, they 
cannot hold the entire obligation.  Perhaps some responsibility rests with the institution itself. 
 188. I thank Aaron James for drawing my attention to these arguments. 
 189. Christine M. Korsgaard, Personal Identity and Unity of Agency: A Kantian Response to Parfit, in 
CREATING THE KINGDOM OF ENDS 363, 370 (Christine M. Korsgaard ed., 1996); see also Walter 
Sinnott-Armstrong & Stephen Behnke, Criminal Law and Multiple Personality Disorder: The Vexing 
Problems of Personhood and Responsibility, 10 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 277, 284 (2001) (“Since John 
Locke, the bodily criterion of personal identity has been rejected by most philosophers on the basis of 
examples in which minds exchange bodies.”). 
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responsibilities to organizations.  For example, we feel loyalty to, affinity with, 
or anger at organizations.  It might serve the same function to feel loyalty to 
“that collection of people who have similar employment contracts, work together 
in the same building during certain hours, wear the same uniform, or use the 
same institutional name on their business cards.”  But, that description does not 
capture the right image for people who are loyal alumni or team boosters.  It is 
my ongoing identification with the organization that makes it coherent for me 
to call myself a “Celtics fan,” even though I have not been to a game in years, 
and cannot name a single player on the current team roster or, for that matter, 
any since the 1980s.190 
While this Article is concerned with organizational ethics apart from 
healthcare ethics, the subject must be considered in light of the obligations that 
derive from the goods that hospitals provide.  I assume that some amount of basic 
healthcare is a special good, the provision of which should not be determined 
exclusively by market principles.191  A corporate form that cannot, or likely will 
not, meet those demands should be rejected.  If it should happen, for example, 
that people are burdened by the existence of for-profit hospitals such that they 
do not receive the level or quality of care that justice requires, they would have 
a complaint against permitting that corporate form.  I only briefly address this 
large issue of justice, focusing instead on a second set of questions, internal to 
hospital operations, regarding the moral permissibility of corporate forms.  How 
should hospitals behave in light of the forms that they have chosen to adopt?  
And, do these obligations make any particular corporate form or mix of forms 
desirable? 
In this part, I claim that the “organizational duty of integrity,” defined 
below, generates moral obligations that differ by ownership.  I focus on the dis-
cretionary decisions of hospitals, those decisions that are not otherwise 
constrained by moral obligations that arise from the good they provide and 
which, therefore, apply to all hospitals.  For-profit hospitals have the privilege 
of making discretionary decisions for the pursuit of profits per se.  Not-for-profit 
hospitals do not have this privilege.  The discussion concludes that at least 
some nongovernment hospitals adopt the not-for-profit form thereby, denying 
themselves the privilege of pursuing profits per se. 
                                                                                                                            
 190. Thanks to Don Herzog for giving me this example. 
 191. Economists widely agree that the “conventional assumptions of welfare economics are chal-
lenged in the healthcare sector,” in large part because of nonconventional characteristics of healthcare as a 
good.  Jeremiah Hurley, An Overview of the Normative Economics of the Health Sector, in 1A HANDBOOK 
OF HEALTH ECON., supra note 30, at 56, 56. 
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A. Healthcare and Justice: Healthcare as a State Obligation 
One set of ideas about the distribution of healthcare presupposes that it is 
an ordinary market good.  Assuming a fair political structure to set the broad 
conditions of market exchange, there is no basis for the state to intervene in the 
distribution of healthcare.  Many proponents of this approach are motivated by 
the libertarian concern that by focusing on end-states, theories characterizing 
health care as a special good compromise individual autonomy and state 
neutrality.192  Others believe that although there is a limited role for the state in 
supplying care for the poor, healthcare is generally a private matter for which 
individuals can and should make their own purchasing decisions.193 
Assuming the appropriateness of the market paradigm, treating healthcare 
in this manner ignores several characteristics of healthcare and insurance mar-
kets194 that make a pure market allocation particularly unfair,195 unwise,196 or inef-
ficient.197  For example, even people of average or high wealth are unable to cover 
the costs of medicine necessary to treat the extreme illnesses that affect many 
people during their lives.  Therefore, people need insurance or some other guar-
antee that care will be provided if they become sick.  Healthy people, however, 
may not adequately foresee the effect of being sick and either do not buy 
insurance or enough of it.  Many poor, and some middle class, people believe 
that they are unable to afford actuarially-fair insurance.198  All kinds of negative 
externalities arise from these problems. 
                                                                                                                            
 192. “Libertarians insist that all rights to social goods based on enforced beneficence violate the prin-
ciple of respect for autonomy.”  TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF 
BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 351 (4th ed. 1994). 
 193. See Daniel Wikler, The Virtuous Hospital: Do Nonprofit Institutions Have a Distinctive Moral 
Mission?, in IN SICKNESS AND IN HEALTH, supra note 5, at 127, 133 (outlining, though not advocating, 
the view). 
 194. This part discusses basic facts about contemporary insurance markets.  To assume them away 
to consider a pure free market argument, would be to hypothesize so implausible a counterfactual situa-
tion as to make the policy recommendations stemming from the argument of little use. 
 195. Ronald Dworkin, Will Clinton's Plan Be Fair?, N.Y.  REV. BOOKS, Jan. 13, 1994, at 20, 22 
(arguing that the prudence principle should apply to healthcare systems.  Under the principle, resources 
should be allocated between health and other needs by imagining what care would be provided if a free and 
unsubsidized market existed without the three deficiencies that make market solutions unfair—unfair 
distribution of wealth, inadequate risk information, and adverse selection). 
 196. Experimental economists have found that people do not treat healthcare like an ordinary 
market good.  They make different allocation decisions regarding the “same good depending on whether 
the good is described as generating important health effects (which creates notions of need) or as simply 
desired as a consumer good (which is based simply on tastes/preferences).  Hurley, supra note 191, at 88 
(citing M. Yaari & M. Bar-Hillel, On Dividing Justly, 1 SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE 1–24 (1984)). 
 197. See Part A of the Conclusion for a discussion of hospital form and market failures. 
 198. Michael Chernew et al., Explanations for the Decline in Health Insurance Coverage (2003) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (establishing that as price increases, insurance take-up 
rates decline). 
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That some people do not recognize the value of insurance or are unable to 
buy it is a matter of state concern for several reasons.  The state may have a pru-
dential interest in promoting the health of its citizens for reasons independent 
of their preferences or of benefits to any individual.199  States, for example, need 
healthy citizens to staff an economically productive work force and participate 
in the citizenry.  Poor health has negative externalities in terms of public 
health, financial costs, and emotional sacrifice.  In contemporary societies that 
fund healthcare for the poor, the state bears some of the cost of healthcare to 
uninsured or underinsured individuals.  Good health reduces the burden of these 
costs. 
Even if there were no externalities to the state, denying healthcare to peo-
ple for whom others may make insurance decisions, such as children,200 the 
elderly,201 or the mentally ill, is unfair.  Some types of healthcare are essential 
for realizing normal life prospects, such as primary, pre-natal and pediatric care.  
Some of the aspects of care most determinative of life prospects are needed in 
childhood, when patients do not make their own decisions.  Other kinds of care 
can, at relatively low cost, alleviate debilitating misfortune.  Finally, most peo-
ple lack the knowledge to assess adequately the type and amount of healthcare 
they need.  Many of the most serious healthcare decisions must be made when 
the patient is incapacitated.  While there is considerable disagreement regard-
ing the quantity, quality, and delivery mechanism that justice requires, there is 
widespread agreement that basic healthcare is not an ordinary market good. 
The discussion so far grants the premise that healthcare is merely a com-
modity, a good that is appropriately bought and sold in markets, though one 
with special characteristics.  Thinking about healthcare in terms of money, 
markets, and financial trade, however, may not be appropriate.  That healthcare 
is now supplied with so many restrictions fits the intuition that it is different 
from ordinary market goods.  People walk into shops and freely buy socks for 
themselves or others every day, and we think nothing of it.  Fortunately, even if 
they wanted to, people are not permitted to walk into a hospital and buy 
laparoscopic aortic surgery as a birthday gift.202 
                                                                                                                            
 199. See Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1138 
(1986) (discussing how the law frequently, often justifiably, overrides individual preferences to protect 
citizens or recognize their “preferences about preferences”). 
 200. See IAN SHAPIRO, DEMOCRATIC JUSTICE 92–96 (1999) (offering a more general argument 
for why the state should be responsible for children’s interests). 
 201. See id. at 196–229 (comparing the needs of the elderly to those of children). 
 202. Though, one wonders about the recent advertisements for MRIs as the perfect gift for a 
loved one.  See, e.g., Robert H. Shmerling, Medical Myth: ‘Whole-Body’ MRI—A Good Stocking Stuffer 
This Holiday? Aetna InteliHealth at http://www.intelihealth.com/IH/ihtIH/WSIHW000/333/349/ 
357461.html (last visited July 19, 2003). 
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There is a large literature in which scholars consider why goods such as 
healthcare, education, political power, and others are not market goods.203  
Some find a distinctive logic for the distribution of medical care in the culture 
that provides it.204  In our culture, Michael Walzer argues, the common under-
standing of medical care requires “that care should be proportionate to illness 
and not to wealth.”205  Margaret Radin and others disagree that there is any single 
logic of distribution that emerges from a good, even considering the social 
context in which it is provided.  It could be that social goods like healthcare 
have internal characteristics and are distributed in social contexts that imply an 
allocational logic, or even conflicting logics.206  Accordingly, goods like health-
care can be partially commodified.207 
Others find a distributional logic to healthcare in human need, rather 
than in the good itself or people’s demand for it.208  Here, too, there are alter-
native views.  Perhaps the distribution of goods should be evaluated based on 
how well people fare with their share of the good.209  Perhaps each person should 
                                                                                                                            
 203. See, for example, Don Herzog, How to Think About Equality, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1621, 1632 
(2002), in which Herzog points out, “it’s an open question whether or not the things we currently allocate 
on the market are commodities.  Maybe we shouldn’t buy and sell healthcare at all.”  He offers several 
examples of social practices that would be undermined if things like jury verdicts, political decisions, or 
friendship were commodified and offered for money in markets.  Id. at 1634. 
 204. See, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 
79 (1983).  In reference to defining what people need, Michael Walzer writes: “Only [a society’s] cul-
ture, its character, its common understandings can define the ‘wants’ that are to be provided for.”  Id.; 
see also ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 143 (1993) (agreeing with Walzer 
about the importance of “shared understandings . . . [as] the proper starting point of political argument.”  
But, arguing that “justification need not be confined to such understandings,” and that justification 
requires background conditions that place people in positions of equality from which to agree.) 
 205. WALZER, supra note 204, at 86.  While Walzer’s view does not admit an a priori determination 
of the quantity or quality of care that justice requires the state to provide, he suggests that when medical 
care becomes recognized as a social need and the community invests in it, as has happened in the 
United States, money should not determine the distribution because it would inappropriately dominate 
and corrupt the good.  “So long as communal funds are spent, as they currently are, to finance research, 
build hospitals, and pay the fees of doctors in private practice, the services that these expenditures 
underwrite must be equally available to all citizens.”  Id. at 90. 
 206. See, e.g., MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES (1996); Herzog, supra note 
203, at 1634–35. 
 207. Elizabeth Anderson offers an example of partial commodification in her discussion of why 
markets may both promote and undermine equality of opportunity and autonomy.  ELIZABETH 
ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 146 (1993).  Market limits are necessary so that doctors, 
for example, do not “perform profitable but medically unwarranted services on ignorant or demanding 
patients.”  Id. 
 208. T.M. Scanlon, Preference and Urgency, 72 J. PHIL. 655 (1975) (arguing that desire and 
welfare are not necessarily connected). 
 209. Amartya Sen argues against valuing and distributing commodities in terms of their innate 
characteristics because “the characteristics of the goods do not tell us what the person will be able to do 
with those properties.”  AMARTYA SEN, COMMODITIES AND CAPABILITIES 9 (1985).  He concludes 
that “how well a person is must be a matter of what kind of life he or she is living, and what the person is 
succeeding in ‘doing’ or ‘being’.”  Id. at 28. 
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have enough healthcare to maintain the human capabilities necessary to 
flourish, such as use of the five senses.210  Perhaps the state should limit its 
concern for the distribution of care to the political, allowing people to function 
on a politically equal playing field.  According to John Rawls, satisfying health-
care needs is a precondition for a just political society, because only with a basic 
level of healthcare can “citizens . . . make intelligent and effective use of their 
freedoms.”211  Others make narrower political claims, identifying healthcare as a 
precondition of democracy212 or the product of a just society.213  Or, finally, 
                                                                                                                            
 210. Martha Nussbaum, Aristotelian Social Democracy, in NECESSARY GOODS 135, 138 (Gillian 
Brock ed., 1998) (citing W.D. Ross, Aristotle: Politics 133b25-7; cf. 1325b7, 1334a27-9 (1957)).  For a 
description of basic human capabilities, see id. at 150. 
 211. JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 49 (1999).  Without “basic healthcare assured for all 
citizens . . . excessive and unreasonable inequalities tend to develop” that would prevent people from 
using their freedoms.  Building on A Theory of Justice, Norman Daniels specifies the level of healthcare 
necessary such that people can participate in a just society.  See, e.g., NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH 
CARE (1985).  Daniels argues that the state must answer its members’ relevant healthcare needs, which 
are defined by two characteristics.  First, they must be objective (others agree with them) rather than 
subjective (things we feel ourselves to need).  Needs are objectively important because “impairments of 
normal species functioning reduce the range of opportunity open to the individual in which he may 
construct his ‘plan of life’ [which is similar to utility function except it implies satisfaction of desires over 
the long-term] or ‘conception of the good’.”  Id. at 27.  Second, they must be objectively important to 
normal functioning.  Id. at 34.  Because people have a fundamental interest in maintaining a normal 
range of opportunities, society ought to protect the normal opportunity range of its members.  
Maintaining the normal range, however, does not mean that all individuals will have access to the 
entire range of opportunity in a society.  Daniels’ main concern is that “impairment of normal 
functioning through disease and disability restricts an individual’s opportunity relative to that portion of the 
normal range his skills and talents would have made available to him were he healthy.”  Id. at 33–34. 
 212. Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, for example, characterize adequate healthcare as 
one component of a set of basic opportunities necessary for the background conditions that allow for 
deliberative democracy.  Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy is Different, 
SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y, Winter 2002, at 161, 170.  They argue:  
Mutually binding institutions, laws, and policies that deprive individuals of the basic oppor-
tunities necessary for making choices among good lives cannot be mutually justified.  Those 
basic opportunities typically include adequate healthcare. . . . These goods are necessary for 
living a decent life and having the ability to make choices among good lives.  A principle of 
basic opportunity calls for giving individuals the capacity to make choices among good lives by 
providing them with the basic opportunities that give them such a capacity. 
Id. at 170.  Gutmann and Thompson identify fair opportunity, another component of deliberative 
democracy, as a principle that requires fair distribution of goods such as important but strictly unnec-
essary healthcare services. 
Reciprocity also prescribes a principle of fair opportunity, which in turn calls for nondiscrimi-
nation in the distribution of social resources that are highly valued but may not be essential to 
living a good life or having a choice among good lives.  The principle of fair opportunity rests 
on the reciprocal claim that discrimination against individuals on morally irrelevant grounds 
in the distribution of scarce social goods such as professional offices cannot be justified to the 
individuals who are being discriminated against. 
Id. at 170–71. 
 213. Ezekiel Emanuel, for example, identifies state responsibilities as those healthcare needs 
identified by small deliberative communities that develop shared conceptions of the good.  EZEKIEL J. 
EMANUEL, THE ENDS OF HUMAN LIFE: MEDICAL ETHICS IN A LIBERAL POLITY (1991). 
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maybe justice and democracy are mutually reinforcing and should be pursued 
together.214 
The theory of not-for-profit responsibility that I develop below rests on the 
assumptions that healthcare is a special good and that it should not be treated 
as an ordinary market good.  Whether the reasons for special treatment are 
grounded on a market failure or noncommodification argument has little bearing 
on my theory.  I survey the various ideas here only to establish that the state 
has a central role in the regulation and provision of healthcare. 
B. The Duty of Integrity 
In many countries, concluding that we owe each other healthcare would 
end this discussion.  The moral obligations of healthcare institutions would be 
coextensive with those of the state.  But in the United States, we have a mixed 
provision system.  Healthcare is provided by public and private institutions, 
both for-profit and not-for-profit. 
Our decisions to allow these private institutions to exist should be made 
very carefully.  They can be dangerous creatures.215  Yet, unlike human beings 
(who can also be dangerous creatures), organizations have no inherent right to 
exist.  And, in the case of healthcare, where the state owes a duty to provide 
the good, there is an even greater presumption against authorizing private organi-
zations to fulfill government functions.  Healthcare organizations, for example, 
have the power to make decisions regarding who can get different qualities and 
quantities of care. 
On balance, there are good reasons to authorize such creatures.216  There 
are some important ends, such as operating a hospital, that require collective 
action.  In addition, we may prefer that the action be private because the gov-
ernment is unable or unlikely to provide desirable services or to provide them 
in a desirable way.  Private organizations may present a mechanism for expressive 
                                                                                                                            
 214. SHAPIRO, supra note 200, at 1–16.  Shapiro offers healthcare as an example of a good that is 
part of the basic commitment to individuals, but the legitimate distribution of which depends to a large 
degree on the number of people affected and their role in determining the distribution.  See id. ch. 7. 
 215. See PETER A. FRENCH, COLLECTIVE AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY, at xi–xii (1984) 
(making the extreme case that organizations can cause negative outcomes and that they can be under-
stood as fully intentional actors in doing so). 
 216. The model of authorizing organizational existence is not only a useful tool for considering 
the moral permissibility of institutions, but also describes how corporations were historically formed in 
the United States.  Corporations existed only if legislatures, using a deliberative process, authorized 
them.  Historically, the price of getting a corporate charter from a state legislature was a promise to take 
on a particular goal in perpetuity.  Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 
559–62 (1819). 
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acts, for which state organizations could not substitute.217  For example, a 
religious order may wish to found a hospital to express its spiritual goals.  
Centralized state provision of healthcare would necessarily limit the type of care 
available.  A system comprised of private institutions could foster pluralism, not 
only in terms of religious or cultural expression but also in terms of the diversity 
of medical treatments offered.218  And, while it need not necessarily be the case, 
much medical innovation has come from nongovernment institutions such as 
private university hospitals and affiliated medical schools that benefit from 
public funding but operate as nongovernment corporations.  Finally, some 
goods such as cross-subsidization may be impossible for the government to 
provide.  One could easily imagine a private hospital reallocating funding from 
profitable to unprofitable services such as AIDS treatment, while a government 
hospital may be unable to do so because of the political unpopularity of the 
disease coupled with the transparency requirements of public institutions.219 
A second set of justifications for preferring private provision of hospital 
care to public is practical.  Daniel Wikler has argued that while the primary 
responsibility to provide necessary goods may be a public responsibility, it is a 
responsibility that is not met.  Not-for-profit hospitals can and should take these 
responsibilities as their own: “What matters, from the point of view of social 
justice, is that the job gets done, not which agency does it.”220 
Once the state authorizes private institutions to provide medical care—and, 
in a healthcare system built predominantly on private research and delivery, to 
define it—the state loses much of its power to control the quality and quantity 
of healthcare delivered to its citizens.  The state cannot, and perhaps should 
not, specify all the terms of healthcare that justice demands.  The state of the 
art and societal definitions of required care can change quickly.  Details that 
may seem trivial in general may be crucial for the treatment of any single 
                                                                                                                            
 217. See, e.g., Minow, supra note 7, at 1080–81 (discussing, in part, the pluralist tradition of not-
for-profits). 
 218. “The stringent demands of governmental order, regularity, public transparency, and par-
ticipation can squelch varieties of expression, practice, and belief associated with distinctive ethnic, 
religious, geographic, and individualist traditions.”  Id. at 1081. 
 219. But see, e.g., Clark, supra note 1, at 1468–71.  Clark has rejected the use of not-for-profit 
hospitals to supply public goods through cost subsidization because he believes it employs unjust 
taxation (all who are billed must pay without consenting to the transferred portion of the bill), leads to 
unacceptable growth of medical spending that could be solved by centralized government spending 
policy, and could lead to too much provision of profitable but medically unnecessary care.  Daniel 
Wikler has answered these concerns by arguing the redistributions may provide a greater good than the 
injustice of redistributing from sick rich patients to sick poor patients, hospitals may obtain consent from 
payers to shift funds, and that profits from the treatment of sick people that are transferred to sharehold-
ers may raise the same moral problems.  Wikler, supra note 193, at 139. 
 220. Wikler, supra note 193, at 136.  Unlike Wikler, who identifies the obligations of virtuous hospi-
tals, some of which are supererogatory, I deal with the minimal obligations of not-for-profit institutions. 
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patient.  For example, some hospitals do not have equipment such as appropri-
ately sized hospital gowns to treat obese patients with dignity.221 
Even if the state could design a complete contract with private providers, 
implementing and monitoring it would be excessively costly.  At least as a prac-
tical matter, we must trust that private institutions will behave morally.  While 
there may be large overlap between the moral and legal obligations of hospitals, 
they are not coextensive.  Corporations have discretionary powers that lie 
outside of any contract.  Melissa Lane has called these powers “‘prerogative’ 
[powers] by analogy to Locke’s discussion of the prerogative of the political 
ruler, who may act for the public good where the laws are silent.”222 
C. Basis and Content of the Duty of Integrity 
Each organization’s constitution, by which I mean the set of terms that 
the organization represents as its principles and operating goals, forms the basis 
of the authorization for the private institution to provide healthcare.  Because 
the authorization to exist comes from the acceptability of what the organization 
says it will do, all hospitals have a duty of integrity.  This duty of integrity 
means that the organizational constitution acts as a moral constraint on behav-
ior.  An organization may not act from expediency, conviction, or institutional 
ends that violate its constitution.  If the organization wishes to change in a way 
that would violate its constitution, it needs to obtain new authorization.223  The 
organizational constitution of a hospital would include some terms that have to 
do with healthcare, some that are a matter of healthcare justice, and others that 
address corporate form.  So, while for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals both 
have duties of integrity, the content of those duties may be different because 
the organizations made different representations when they obtained permission 
to exist.  The duty should not be construed as a simple contractual duty.  The 
terms of the constitution and its implementation do not spring from the 
exchange itself.  Instead, the authorization of the corporation comes from the 
acceptability of the governing terms in relation to social needs, which are con-
tinually read into the enactment of the terms.  The duty of integrity ensures 
that organizations act to answer social need. 
                                                                                                                            
 221. I am grateful to Kristi Olson for bringing this example, as well as the example of hospitals with-
out medically appropriate equipment such as operating tables that support obese patients, to my attention. 
 222. Melissa Lane, Autonomy as a Central Human Right and its Implications for the Moral Responsi-
bilities of Corporations, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE MORAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF CORPORATE AND 
PUBLIC SECTOR ORGANISATIONS (Tom Campbell & Miller Seumas eds., 2003 forthcoming). 
 223. This Article deals with the ideal case in which hospitals are either not-for-profit or for-profit 
and they do not change form.  Complications include organizational change.  Organizations in the real 
world cannot be expected to obtain new authorization every time they change to respond to surrounding 
conditions. 
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1. Authorizing Organizations 
Consider how a hospital organization might obtain authorization.  A 
group of people come together and announce, “we want to provide healthcare, 
we think a hospital is a good mechanism through which to provide care, and 
we have a plan of how to do it.”  We (which could mean the state) might reply, 
“Healthcare is awfully important and organizing is a dangerous activity, so we can 
only decide if we know more about your plan.”  Now consider four situations: 
a.     The Impermissible For-Profit Hospital 
The first group believes that the best way to provide hospital care is to 
organize as a fully commercial for-profit corporation.  There are many reasons 
that founders might prefer this form.  They might think that consumer demand 
(or consumer demand as shaped and represented by private insurance or public 
reimbursement policies) accurately reflects what patients want to consume.  
They might believe that doctors will provide more cost-efficient care in such a 
setting.  They might believe that healthcare is no different from other goods 
and that its distribution should be subject only to market demand.  Or, they 
might think that this form will produce an institution that can respond to 
healthcare needs nimbly.  Therefore, they propose the following organizing 
principle: “Our organization will pursue profitmaking.” 
Despite the founders’ good, or not so good, intentions, the state should not 
authorize organizations with unconditional purposes like this one.  Because of the 
importance of healthcare as a basic good that society must distribute by fair pro-
cedures with fair outcomes, the state will need assurances about the organization’s 
behavior as a hospital qua hospital.  In other words, citizens have claims on the 
state for the provision of at least some hospital care and, therefore, the state 
cannot delegate this important function without good reason to do so and confi-
dence that it will be fulfilled acceptably.  However, the proposal of this first group 
of founders includes a statement of principles that boils down to a license to do 
whatever the managers and directors choose to do.  Even if the founders are 
skilled doctors and administrators, the strong presumption against organizations 
that might jeopardize guaranteed social goods trumps free market concerns.224 
We might fear that this organization would jeopardize care because, for 
example, it could make market entry or exit decisions solely according to its 
balance sheet.  The motivations for such decisions may be legally permitted but 
morally objectionable.  For example, a hospital might choose to locate in 
                                                                                                                            
 224. Even if other people would organize to fill the unmet need, some people would depend on 
the original organization and would be harmed. 
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a region where payments for services are likely to be high (for example, where a 
high proportion of patients are wealthy and pay their medical bills directly, not 
using insurance), but the area is already amply served by existing hospitals.  Even 
if the entry of another hospital would cause people to get too much healthcare, 
such as unnecessary or unduly risky procedures, the hospital described above 
could not be prevented from entering.  By incorporating with the sole purpose 
of pursuing profits, this hospital would also be permitted to exit in response to 
falling profits, even if the remaining profits were sufficient to operate the 
hospital and the exit would leave the local population without adequate health-
care.  Under a less dramatic scenario, this hospital might skimp on quality to 
generate profits because it would not be bound by quality requirements 
b.     The Permissible For-Profit Hospital 
The second group of founders also believes that the best way to provide 
healthcare is through a for-profit corporation.  The founders differ from the first 
in believing that, because healthcare is unlike conventional commercial goods 
and because hospitals are special institutions, the constitution must include 
terms addressing medical care.  The founders want the duty of integrity to apply 
both to being a hospital and to being a profitmaking institution.  Therefore, 
they offer the following organizing principle: “Our organization will provide 
medical care through a hospital in order to make a profit.” 
This principle answers the security objections that were made against the 
first for-profit because it binds the hospital organization to the requirements of 
being a hospital.  These requirements would be quite extensive, including, for 
example, refraining from jeopardizing the operations of other hospitals and their 
patients.  To the extent that we endorse the private provision of care, believe 
the efficiency claims of the founders, or think that the for-profit market can 
effectively promote desirable pluralism, we would authorize this form. 
c.      The Impermissible Not-for-Profit Hospital 
A third group of founders might disagree with the utility or appropriate-
ness of for-profit medicine and prefer the not-for-profit form.  They might fear 
that they (or future administrators) will be greedy and use the not-for-profit 
form to commit themselves (and future administrators) to soft incentives (pro-
tecting donors, volunteers, consumers, and employees from ex post expropriation 
of profits).225  They might believe that not-for-profit incorporation signals to 
                                                                                                                            
 225. EDWARD L. GLAESER & ANDREI SHLEIFER, NOT-FOR-PROFIT ENTREPRENEURS (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. w6810, 1998), http://www.nber.org/papers/w6810 (last 
visited July 19, 2003). 
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potential donors that the healthcare provided at their hospital is high quality.226  
Or, they might think that for any number of reasons the not-for-profit form 
causes better health outcomes or a better professional environment. 
Therefore, their funding principle reads: “Our organization will pursue any 
charitable goal (defined morally as doing good, or legally through something 
like the charitable exemption sections of the tax code).”  This constitution raises 
security problems similar to those of the impermissible for-profit form.  While we 
would not worry that the hospital would skimp on care such that the institution 
compromised justice in pursuit of profits, the institution might skimp on care to 
answer nonhealthcare needs that are also matters of social justice.  In other 
words, they might cross-subsidize outside the bounds of the hospital.  In the 
extreme, we should worry that the institution, would exit in a way that would 
jeopardize the health of the hospital’s patients or community.  The history of 
hospital conversions suggests the fear is reasonable.  Board members have 
decided that their not-for-profit hospital was obsolete, and have redirected assets 
to ends that, though likely to create public benefit, were not related to health-
care at all.  In some states they moved the assets without any government over-
sight and without demonstrating that their hospital purposes were obsolete.227 
d.      The Permissible Not-for-Profit Hospital 
The final group founders, like the impermissible not-for-profit founders, 
believes that the not-for-profit form is better for achieving hospital goals.  They 
also believe that a constitution including hospital duties provides the right kind 
of security for patients and society generally.  For the reasons outlined in the 
other three cases, the proposed principle—“Our organization will provide medi-
cal care through a hospital as a not-for-profit corporation”—should be permitted. 
*** 
 
To summarize, the state has an underlying obligation to offer the care it 
provides through contracts with private institutions, such as hospitals.  The 
four scenarios above illustrate that when a particularly important service is at 
stake, we should authorize only organizations that would protect that service.  
The duty of integrity stems from the exchange between the state and a private 
institution—it is a promise to be what the hospital represented itself as being at 
its founding. 
                                                                                                                            
 226. Mark Kim, Money & Mission: How Nonprofit Organizations Finance Their Charitable 
Activities (2002) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with author). 
 227. HORWITZ, supra note 121. 
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There might be additional reasons for hospitals to behave according to their 
not-for-profit principles.  First, the state might grant privileges, such as tax 
exemption or access to tax-exempt financing, to some types of hospitals and not 
to others based on the form of incorporation.  These legal privileges constitute 
an additional promise to act as a not-for-profit.  Second, community members 
might rely on the behavior implied by the form.  Owners of for-profit hospitals 
are being reasonable when they expect sufficient returns on their investments.  
Patients of not-for-profits are being reasonable when they expect not-for-profit 
hospitals to remain in operation even though profits may decline but needed 
services can be provided with the remaining revenues.  These promises and 
reasonable reliance on them buttress the moral responsibilities of hospitals that 
stem from choice of form, but they are not primary.  In the ideal cases, founders 
of the organizations represented the forms as the best way to organize a hospital 
(that is, an organization that provides medical care and surgery to sick or 
injured people).  These other legally conferred benefits can and do change with 
changes in tax law and public opinion.  Should the legal benefits be removed, 
the duty of integrity would remain. 
2. Hospitals in Operation: Similarities and Differences 
The constitutions of both types of permissible hospitals include terms that 
are basic to the commitment of hospitals as healthcare providers.  Because 
these terms must derive from a broad conception of healthcare justice, this 
discussion provides only a background to understand how the duty of integrity 
requires substantially similar behavior for not-for-profit and for-profits. 
The basic commitment involved in being a hospital is a commitment to 
improve life through delivering medical care.  This commitment can be found 
in the extremely similar mission statements of for-profit228 and not-for-profit 
hospitals.229  Many specific terms can be generated from the central institu-
                                                                                                                            
 228. For example, the mission and values statement of Columbia/HCA, the largest for-profit 
hospital chain in the country reads:  
Above all else, we are committed to the care and improvement of human life.  In recognition 
of this commitment, we strive to deliver high quality, cost effective healthcare in the commu-
nities where we serve.  In pursuit of our mission, we believe the following value statements are 
essential and timeless.  We recognize and affirm the unique and intrinsic worth of each 
individual.  We treat all those we serve with compassion and kindness.  We act with absolute 
honesty, integrity and fairness in the way we conduct our business and the way we live our 
lives.  We trust our colleagues as valuable members of our healthcare team and pledge to treat 
one another with loyalty, respect, and dignity. 
HCA 2001 Annual Report (12/3/01) http://ir.thomsonfn.com/InvestorRelations/IRfiles/8847/ 
pdfs/2001.pdf (last visited July 19, 2003). 
 229. For example, the not-for-profit Massachusetts General Hospital Mission Statement is “To pro-
vide the highest quality care to individuals and to the community, to advance care through excellence 
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tional principles found in all hospital constitutions.  For example, hospitals 
must provide care at a certain level of quality (at the very least, institutions 
must provide goods, not bads), with sensitivity to what is considered normal 
care in the society, granting the patients due autonomy, and so on.  The specific 
terms of the healthcare constitution will change with social context as medical 
developments and social expectations change.230  The institutions must have 
the flexibility to provide healthcare as the definition of care and its role in 
society changes.  They might reasonably decide that operating a hospital is not 
the best method of providing healthcare.  However health services develop, 
decisions regarding their provision must be made based on the responsibility to 
provide healthcare.  And, whatever responsibilities do or do not arise from 
being a provider of healthcare ought to apply to all hospitals equally. 
The most important difference in moral obligation generated by the organ-
izational choice between not-for-profit and for-profit hospitals is that for-profits 
have a privilege that does not accrue to not-for-profits: For-profits can make 
decisions in the pursuit of profits per se, while not-for-profit hospitals may not 
make decisions for this reason.  Decisions to invest in certain services offer an 
example of how the for-profit privilege plays out.  A for-profit hospital can 
decide which services to provide based on the profitability of the service, as 
long as that decision does not violate the ethical responsibilities of the hospital 
as a healthcare provider.  This means that if the hospital invests in a service 
because it is profitable it must invest in related, unprofitable services if those 
services are needed to support the profitable service.  For example, a for-profit 
hospital may wish to offer cardiac services or orthopedic services because those 
services generate substantial profits.  They must provide the staffing necessary 
to offer those services well, even if the staffing beyond the surgeon’s position is 
not profitable.  The service array must be sufficient to allow doctors to be good 
doctors. 
Not-for-profit hospitals are forbidden from making their decisions based on 
the pursuit of profitmaking per se; doing so would contradict their constitutive 
principles.  Not-for-profit hospitals cannot decide to offer services solely to 
generate profits, but could do so to subsidize other services that they could not 
otherwise offer.  Under this theory, a not-for-profit hospital could market 
special services to particularly high-paying clientele to subsidize unprofitable 
services.  For example, the not-for-profit McLean Hospital, a psychiatric hos-
pital in Belmont, Massachusetts, recently initiated “The Pavilion,” a service 
                                                                                                                            
in biomedical research, and to educate future academic and practice leaders of the healthcare professions.”  
Massachusetts General Hospital, Mission Statement, http://www.massgeneral.org/about.html (last visited 
July 19, 2003). 
 230. See HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, WITTGENSTEIN AND JUSTICE 3–8 (1972) (discussing the 
relationship between social change, institutions, and language). 
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“created for people requiring expert psychiatric, behavioral and neuralgic 
consultation, . . . geared to the needs of the private-pay patient and family, 
offering the kind of choice, flexibility, confidentiality and service not found in 
today’s healthcare world.”231  Marketing material boasts that private payment 
brings with it amenities such as car transport and accommodations at local five-
star hotels.232  Leaving aside the equity issues raised by this service (for example, 
many people are unable to obtain basic mental health services and cannot buy 
the confidentiality that is advertised as part of The Pavilion’s treatment), the 
hospital would be morally permitted to offer this service in order to subsidize care 
of the indigent or to hire more staff.  Some judgment is needed to determine at 
what point this behavior violates the duty of integrity, but some amount of 
profit-seeking in the service of charitable goals leaves the distinction among 
forms intact.  In other words, it is the sustained pattern of decisions that 
differentiates hospital types, not any particular decision. 
The duty of integrity for not-for-profit hospitals affects behavior in a narrow 
but important discretionary space.  That this duty may guide relatively few 
decisions stems from the vast area of moral responsibility of all hospitals.  Wikler, 
for example, has noted that “good healthcare, more than most other revenue-
producing activity, requires behavior, which, at least in the short-to-medium 
run, is directly contrary to profit maximization.”233  If this view is correct, for-
profit hospitals are morally forbidden to pursue a strategy of profit maximization 
that would produce bad healthcare.  As a practical matter, these duties may be 
of growing importance.  Eric Orts has argued that the growth of institutional 
investors and the corresponding increase in pressure on investor-owned corpo-
rations to produce profits is making it more difficult for those corporations to 
meet social responsibilities.234 
Further, the duty of integrity cannot make impossible mandates.  Not-for-
profit hospitals need to earn enough profit to be going concerns.  They can and 
do generate earnings that are equivalent to profits, known as fund balances.  
Earning profits on services to advance the hospital’s constitutive goals is 
acceptable.  Even controversial financial activities like maintaining a large fund 
balance might be reconciled with not-for-profit duties, if the fund balance is 
maintained for reasons like redistributing health services over time.  Hospitals 
cannot assume that large payers like the government will always pay adequate 
prices, and maintaining a fund balance is one way that a not-for-profit hospital 
can smooth financial volatility over time.  It would not be acceptable, however, 
                                                                                                                            
 231. The Pavilion at McLean Hospital, at http://www.mcleanhospital.org./pavilion/index.htm 
(last visited July 19, 2003). 
 232. Id. 
 233. Wikler, supra note 193, at 138. 
 234. Eric W. Orts, The Future of Enterprise Organization, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1947, 1966 (1998). 
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if managers used large fund balances as a proxy for profitmaking to raise their 
status.  Redistribution among services at not-for-profit hospitals can only occur 
if one service profits, or even earns rents, to fund another. 
D. Nongovernment Hospitals: The Choice of Form 
The analysis thus far has outlined the moral obligations that bind hospitals 
once they choose a corporate form.  But why should we have not-for-profit 
hospitals at all?  The answer depends primarily on the behavioral ramifications 
of corporate form for healthcare.  One only needs to consider briefly the choice 
of treatment by a well-meaning but unskilled doctor or an indifferent but 
skilled doctor to recognize that whether a hospital treats a patient competently 
is more important than its reasons for doing so.  Similarly, that one form is more 
likely, for example, to provide necessary, higher quality, or affordable care is 
reason to prefer the form. 
For now, our knowledge about behavioral differences is too incomplete to 
draw such conclusions about the behavioral implications of form.235  However, as 
discussed in detail above, hospital types behave quite differently in at least one 
important respect—the services they offer.  For-profits are more likely to offer 
profitable services than are not-for-profits; not-for-profits are more likely to offer 
unprofitable services needed by uninsured and poor patients than are for-
profits.  These differences suggest that hospital types act from different goals.  
While the mechanism that translates form into behavior is unclear—perhaps 
the form reminds decisionmakers of their different goals, or perhaps they all 
start with the same goals but the form constrains institutional change—it is 
possible that the behavior derives from the moral duties outlined above.  The 
evidence is consistent with this moral mechanism.  We should therefore prefer 
that at least some hospitals adopt the not-for-profit form for consequential 
reasons. Their moral obligations could translate into desirable behavior. 
There is an expressive, though admittedly secondary, reason for wanting 
at least some hospitals to adopt the not-for-profit form.  Only by having 
hospitals that are forbidden from pursuing profits for profits’ sake do we remind 
ourselves that healthcare is not only a commodity.  This point should not be 
overstated.  Medicine has become professionalized and money drives much of 
the healthcare system.236  This reality will not change if not-for-profit hospitals 
promise to refrain from pursuing profits in the small number of discretionary 
acts covered by the duty of integrity.  Also, behavioral similarities among 
                                                                                                                            
 235. But see Wikler, supra note 193 (arguing that we may have adequate data for preferring not-
for-profit health providers). 
 236. Deborah A. Stone, The Doctor as Businessman: The Changing Politics of a Cultural Icon, 22 J. 
HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 533, 534 (1997). 
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hospital type weakens symbolic justifications for not-for-profits.237  But it is 
easier for us to remember that healthcare is special in helping us to flourish as 
humans and citizens if some of the institutions that provide it promise that 
financial decisions will not come first. 
Given the current state of knowledge, we should not insist that all health-
care institutions build the separation between money and health into all their 
operations.  There are two reasons for this restraint.  First, requiring all private 
hospitals to adopt the moral requirements of not-for-profit hospitals might sac-
rifice other goods.  Some research demonstrates that for-profit hospitals are more 
efficient than others at eliminating overcapacity.  Because they are more respon-
sive to financial incentives in terms of restructuring and exiting markets than 
are not-for-profit hospitals,238 for-profits may be more effective at eliminating 
excess capacity, capacity that is costly as well as potentially dangerous.239  To the 
extent that these incentives are consistent with cost savings and quality, for-
profit hospitals may provide a useful safety supply valve.  Second, there are 
strong restrictions on the pursuit of profits for the for-profit hospitals following 
the moral requirements associated with the provision of healthcare.  These 
restrictions leave a rather small space for pursuing profits. 
CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS:  
CORPORATE FORM MATTERS 
Lawyers, economists, and policymakers have long tried to identify the defin-
ing characteristics of the not-for-profit sector.240  Some have challenged the 
assumption that the sector is a coherent or useful concept at all.241  Others have 
claimed that not-for-profit ownership and the associated tax exemption for 
hospitals are anachronistic.  Their skepticism reflects a prominent strand in the 
empirical literature regarding corporate form, particularly in the hospital industry. 
The evidence described here counters these views.  It demonstrates that 
not-for-profit hospitals are different.  They offer different types of services than 
do other hospitals, likely because they have different missions.  Interestingly, 
the not-for-profit behavior identified here is consistent with the requirements 
of law and morality. 
                                                                                                                            
 237. Bloche, supra note 1, at 348. 
 238. RICHARD ZECKHAUSER ET AL., THE ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR OF FOR-PROFIT AND NONPROFIT 
HOSPITALS: THE IMPACT OF OWNERSHIP ON RESPONSES TO CHANGING REIMBURSEMENT AND 
MARKET ENVIRONMENTS 56 (1995). 
 239. Clark, supra note 1, at 1417–18; HENRY HANSMANN ET AL., OWNERSHIP FORM AND 
TRAPPED CAPITAL IN THE HOSPITAL INDUSTRY (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
w8989, 2002), http://www.nber.org/papers/w8989 (last visited July 19, 2003). 
 240. Hall, supra note 118, at 1–2. 
 241. Id. 
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While I have presented legal and moral arguments for the not-for-profit 
form, the empirical evidence is sufficient to support my thesis.  Not-for-profit 
hospitals solve two market failures.  They (1) provide private goods that insured 
or wealthy patients would like to consume but the market does not provide, 
and (2) compared to for-profits, they offer public goods in the form of undersup-
plied services that are commonly needed by poor and underinsured patients. 
A. Healthcare Quality and Equity 
The availability of a medical service or combination of services affects the 
quality of medical care.  Equivalent hospitals with different corporate forms offer 
different clusters of services, suggesting that quality may also differ by form. 
Hospitals and Medical Decisionmaking.  Several scholars have suggested that 
the focus on the corporate form of hospitals is misplaced because patients do not 
interact with hospitals directly.  Instead, physicians make decisions for patients, 
protecting them against harms that could arise because of informational and 
other asymmetries between patients and hospitals.242  That physicians make some 
treatment decisions only partially mitigates informational asymmetries, and does 
not eliminate the important role hospitals play in patient care. 
The influence of hospitals on medical practice is growing.  Hospitals 
increasingly control medical care and providers through hospital-based group 
practices such as physician-hospital organizations (PHOs) and practice protocols.  
In addition to these formal channels, practice patterns develop informally 
through collegial networks that are formed within organizations. 
Hospital decisions, such as decision about equipment purchasing or depart-
mental structures also affect the range and quality of treatments available.  All 
physicians practice within the constraints set by hospital-level investment and 
policy decisions, and those constraints may adversely affect patient care.  In 
theory, physicians could switch affiliations if they were not able to practice 
effectively at a given hospital.  As a practical matter they are unlikely to do so 
because they retain hospital affiliations, at least in part out of habit,243 and often 
there are few choices of affiliation.  Even if doctors, acting alone or collectively 
as hospital administrators, make decisions about which services to provide, 
these decisions necessarily limit the treatment of any single patient.  Finally, 
the influence that nurses and others employed directly by hospitals exercise over 
patient care is largely outside of physician control. 
                                                                                                                            
 242. Hansmann, supra note 17, at 866–67; Brody, supra note 4, at 463 n.21; Sloan, supra note 30, 
at 1148–49. 
 243. Brody, supra note 4, at 526 n.312 (citing Lawton R. Burns & Douglas R. Wholey, Factors 
Affecting Physician Loyalty and Exit: A Longitudinal Analysis of Physician-Hospital Relationships, 27 HEALTH 
SERV. RES. 1 (1992)). 
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Explaining why the nondistribution constraint is not needed to make not-
for-profit institutions more reliable than other institutions, Evelyn Brody has 
pointed out that healthcare services are brokered not only by doctors but also 
by third parties, such as insurers, who have good information with which to make 
purchasing decisions and thus protect patients.244  As with physician agents, the 
involvement of third party payers only goes so far in alleviating the need to trust 
hospitals.  The tools for monitoring quality are imperfect, and third party payers 
have interests that may not be aligned with patient interests.  Regardless of the 
involvement of these players, there will always be aspects of care for which 
contracting is either impossible or too costly. 
The necessity for trusting hospitals with human life will persist.  Knowing 
which goals hospitals adopt (or which revealed goals emerge out of a messy 
battle of competing subcorporate interests) and how they prioritize those goals 
in making decisions that affect patients remains important in evaluating health-
care quality.  The institutional context in which medical providers operate affects 
the trade-offs among responsibilities to patients, institutions, and society. 
Hospital Form, Quality, and Market Failure.  The empirical work presented 
here does not directly address quality of care.  Because the available services differ 
by form, however, it does suggest that quality may differ by corporate form.  As 
discussed above in the case of angioplasty, a particular service or combinations of 
services may be more effective at treating medical conditions than other services 
usually offered for the same condition.  If the propensity to offer the preferred 
services is correlated with corporate form, then we have reason to prefer that 
form.  In the example of angioplasty treatment for heart attacks, a patient might 
be better off going to a for-profit hospital, all other factors being equal. 
The empirical results presented in Part III also raise questions about the 
quality of for-profit hospitals because, relative to other types of hospitals, the 
services provided are strongly correlated with the profitability of those services.  
It requires undue confidence in healthcare markets and government rate setters 
to believe that, for each hospital, the most profitable mix of services is the most 
medically appropriate mix.  Informational asymmetries, third party payment 
systems, and extensive regulation make it unlikely that service profitability 
corresponds adequately to medical appropriateness.  Public and private insurance 
rates are set through a complex and changing process based on factors that 
include the political strength of interest groups, the evolving judgment of rate 
setters, the negotiating skills of the parties, and imperfect adjustments for demo-
graphic and geographic characteristics of hospital markets.  For these reasons, 
public regulators seek ways to temper financial incentives in public payer 
programs like Medicare. 
                                                                                                                            
 244. Id. at 464–65. 
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This situation implies a market failure for a critical private good—the avail-
ability of medically appropriate services for patients.  Just because patients, 
even insured patients, have access to medical care does not mean that they 
have access to the right services.  Under ordinary circumstances, patients and 
doctors choose among the services offered by a hospital.  If a hospital does not 
offer the medically preferred mix because they offer only the profitable mix, 
neither patients nor their doctors can secure them.  The private goods market is 
no less complex or important than the public goods market that captures the 
attention of scholars studying corporate form. 
Consider the example of trauma centers.  Rich, insured people sometimes 
need trauma services, and would be willing to pay a high price to have the ser-
vices nearby.  If normal market conditions apply, we expect profit-seeking hos-
pitals to supply trauma centers to meet this demand.  If hospitals did not provide 
trauma services, we would conclude that the services were not worth providing 
after all.  This conclusion would be wrong, however, because normal market 
conditions do not apply.  Because patients who need trauma centers are dispro-
portionately poor and uninsured, and because hospitals are forbidden to deny 
emergency treatment to these patients, trauma centers are money losers.  We 
could allow profit-seeking hospitals to turn away trauma patients who are 
unable to pay, but that would be a bad idea (pick your reason—because it would 
be wrong or because of the externalities the policy would incur).  Not-for-profit 
and government hospitals solve this allocative inefficiency precisely because they 
make provision decisions on grounds other than maximizing profits. 
These results also have implications for the treatment of uninsured 
patients.  Not-for-profit hospitals and, especially, government hospitals are 
more likely than for-profit hospitals to provide unprofitable services that are 
differentially needed by the poor.  But the services offered at government 
hospitals are not the only services poor patients need and the barriers to 
transferring uninsured patients to nongovernment hospitals create a de facto 
two-tiered healthcare system.  Poor patients get the services offered at gov-
ernment hospitals, while insured patients get the services offered at for-profit 
hospitals.  Not-for-profit hospitals, however, are more likely to offer 
unprofitable services than for-profit hospitals and are more likely to offer 
profitable services than government hospitals.  Poor patients likely have access 
to a wider range of care at not-for-profit than at government hospitals, because 
it is more difficult to deny a treatment to an uninsured patient admitted to a 
hospital that provides it than to deny a transfer to a different hospital for 
treatment. 
At least until we have more and better information on which bundles of 
services constitute medically appropriate bundles, the balance that not-for-profits 
seem to strike between profits and social needs represents a compromise. 
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B. Tax Exemption 
As discussed in detail above, the persistent mix of corporate forms and 
behavioral similarities in the hospital industry have led observers to criticize 
the not-for-profit tax exemption.  Given the current state of knowledge about 
hospitals, however, I find ample justification to retain the tax exemption for 
not-for-profit hospitals. 
While some scholars maintain that tax exemptions would be justified if not-
for-profit hospitals relieved certain public burdens or provided public benefits (for 
example, charity care or medical education), many find the evidence insuffi-
cient to support this justification.  They find that not-for-profits are too similar 
to for-profits in their behavior to justify exemption.  But, there are many other 
ways, in addition to charity care, to test whether not-for-profit hospitals differ-
entially provide important public goods.  The findings in this Article suggest that 
charity care is too limited a measure of community benefit, and that it misses 
important distinctions among corporate forms.  Before concluding that the 
exemption is not worthwhile, others should consider a broader range of potential 
differences among ownership types, both those that are easily measurable and 
others that are not but can be inferred. 
If insurance markets and government payment systems do not give accurate 
incentives for providing the best array of services according to standards of medi-
cal quality (or even according to standards of cost-contained medical quality), we 
must trust hospitals to balance their response to financial incentives with their 
pursuit of other goals.  We must, therefore, trust hospitals over a much broader 
domain than financial decisionmaking. 
Even the scholars who reject the tax exemption on theoretical grounds rely 
on behavioral evidence to some extent.  Hall and Columbo, among others,245 
have essentially made a two-step argument against tax exemption.246  First, they 
concede that not-for-profit hospitals may provide benefits, although they are 
skeptical about whether they provide these benefits to any greater degree than 
do for-profit hospitals.  However, they argue that providing a benefit is not a 
sufficient justification for tax exemption.  Comparing the exemption to the 
socially valuable activity of mowing our lawns, they dispute that “government 
[should] forego billions of dollars in revenue from nonprofit hospitals for the 
simple reason that society values their services.”247  Like Hansmann and others, 
they reasonably require evidence that ordinary markets cannot do the job.  
                                                                                                                            
 245. Id. at 461; Hyman, supra note 39, at 327 (arguing for subsidies that are targeted to behavioral 
measures rather than corporate form). 
 246. Colombo summarizes the view succinctly in a letter to the editor of The Exempt Organization 
Tax Review.  Colombo, supra note 1 (replying to Robert Boisture, 9 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 785 (1994)). 
 247. Hall & Colombo, supra note 25, at 374. 
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Second, they argue that what is needed is a causal connection between the 
tax exemption and the benefit provided.  Otherwise, they conclude, the 
exemption is no more than a wasteful windfall. 
We cannot know whether not-for-profit hospitals provide these goods 
because of the tax exemption without performing the social experiment of 
removing it.  But, Hall and Colombo err in setting the extremely high standard 
of causation as necessary to the justification for tax exemption.  We are, after 
all, potentially talking about saving lives, not mowing lawns.  If we have reason 
to believe that the policy preferences are likely to be related to social benefits 
such as better quality care or more choices of different types of high-quality 
care, then the cost of the tax preference is surely small in comparison to 
potential benefits.  True, the value of forgone taxes may be high in absolute 
terms.  In the case of property taxes, exemption deprives local governments of 
much-needed funds.  Evaluated in the context of a healthcare system in which 
government payers spend almost $600 billion on care,248 however, the $6 
billion not-for-profit tax exemption seems an odd place to focus on tax 
savings.249 
If one expands the scope of evaluation beyond traditional measures of 
charity, there is ample evidence that ordinary markets comprised of for-profit 
hospitals cannot do the job.  First, the private good discussed above—the 
medically appropriate mix of medical care—is very likely not provided by for-
profit hospitals that choose service offerings primarily on the relative profitability 
of those services.  The provision of this good provides a public benefit in the rele-
vant legal sense of the term—that is the trust law sense (promoting the interests 
of indefinite public beneficiaries) not necessarily the economic sense (nonrival-
rous and nonexcludable) of public goods.250  Similarly, the second not-for-profit 
hospital benefit discussed above—the protection not-for-profits offer against the 
further entrenchment of a class-based, two-tiered medical system—is also a pub-
lic benefit.  To the extent that it satisfies a public desire for fairness in the 
distribution of healthcare, it may meet the stricter, economic definition of a 
public good. 
                                                                                                                            
 248. Levit, supra note 11, at 176. 
 249. If, in the extreme case, not-for-profit hospitals saved lives, that $6 billion is the equiva-
lent of 400 lives valuing a life at $5 million, the typical monetary value of a life.  ($2 billion of 
deadweight loss from the tax exemption/$5 million = 400; the remaining $4 billion is a transfer 
not a loss).  I thank David Cutler for this estimate. 
 250. Public goods are those that are nonrivalrous and nonexcludable.  ANTHONY B. 
ATKINSON & JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, LECTURES ON PUBLIC ECONOMICS 482–87 (1980). 
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C. Using Form as a Regulatory Tool 
The results also suggest new uses for the legal categories as regulatory 
tools.  When payers are unable to “specify a priori and monitor a desired bundle 
of services,” as in the case of healthcare generally and post-acute services 
specifically, economic theory suggests that payments should be relatively low 
powered; they should not provide strong incentives because of the risk of under-
serving needy patients.251  To combat the risks of contracting under these 
circumstances—risks such as selection, skimping, and cream-skimming—scholars 
and policymakers have advocated using complicated reimbursement systems to 
balance and temper incentives.  Corporate form provides another tool for tem-
pering the effects of financial incentives.  If government payers are concerned 
that financial incentives for health reimbursement are too high powered and 
that hospitals will skimp on care as a result, they could use corporate form as a 
proxy for substantive healthcare regulation by using different rates for different 
types of hospitals or by contracting with only not-for-profit hospitals. 
Regulating not-for-profits by form treats all not-for-profits alike.  And, there 
is great variation within form.  One risk is that some not-for-profit organi-
zations would benefit from a “halo” effect.  Responding to these concerns, 
Brody suggests that “society might prefer to subsidize charitable and other social 
outputs produced by all organizations rather than subsidize nonprofits based on 
their organizational form.”252  More broadly, Clark has argued that “the very 
serious market failures in healthcare must be addressed directly, and no reliance 
should be placed on traditional indirect attempts at curing them by use of 
nonprofits.”253  Why not buy the services we want directly rather than use 
corporate form to get them indirectly? 
On its face, subsidizing desired policy ends or addressing market failures 
directly seems logical.  But, at least in the context of hospitals, doing so may be 
neither possible nor desirable.254  In the case of medical care, a complex good 
for which quality measurements are notoriously difficult, direct regulation of 
quality may be impossible.  And, as a general matter, targeted regulation is only 
desirable if the benefits of such regulation are greater than the costs of 
                                                                                                                            
 251. JOSEPH P. NEWHOUSE, MEDICARE POLICY IN THE 1990S 37 (2001). 
 252. Brody, supra note 4, at 461; see also Hyman, supra note 21, at 775 (“Even if one is naïve 
enough to tie the subsidy to organizational status [rather than behavior], one has to be positively 
perverse to structure the system so the subsidy is worth the most to those who need it the least—and 
much of our current hospital subsidy framework accomplishes precisely that.”). 
 253. Clark, supra note 1, at 1418. 
 254. Cf. Hyman, supra note 21, at 771 n.118 (citing RICHARD EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A 
COMPLEX WORLD (1995)) (concluding that that because we cannot precisely match subsidy and desirable 
behavior at the individual hospital level we should not regulate at the general level of corporate form, 
though noting elsewhere in his paper that precision is costly and first-best regulatory solutions are rare). 
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identifying, monitoring, and enforcing the desired behavior.  When consistent 
behavioral patterns can be identified, such as the patterns described above, 
using corporate form as a proxy for direct regulation gives us an additional 
policy lever, perhaps a cost-effective one.  And, in some complex industries like 
healthcare, it may be one of the best we have. 
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